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I. INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama described economic inequality as the “defining 
challenge of our time.”2 He argued that “[t]he combined trends of increased 
inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat to the American 
Dream, [and] our way of life.”3 And he is not alone in viewing inequality as an 
existential threat to both our society and our democracy.4 But why is economic 
inequality so harmful? How did we become the most unequal advanced 
democracy in the world? What could or should the government do about the 
problem? This Article attempts to answer all of those questions. It ultimately 
argues that our government has a fundamental responsibility to limit the amount 
of inequality in society and that the best way to do this is to place a constitutional 
limit on the government’s ability to increase wealth inequality. 
The concept of inequality is central to this Article, so it makes sense to 
begin by defining it. In a general sense, inequality just means a “difference in 
size, degree, [or] circumstances.”5 Of course, there are many kinds of inequality, 
not all of which have a profound impact on our lives. Some kinds of inequality 
2  Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 4 Remarks on the Economy, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/running-transcript-president-obamas-december-4-
remarks-on-the-economy/2013/12/04/7cec31ba-5cff-11e3-be07-
006c776266ed_story.html?noredirect=on (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
3  Id. President Obama’s quote implies that increasing inequality and decreasing social 
mobility are separate issues. In fact, they are related. High levels of inequality decrease social 
mobility. See infra text accompanying notes 70–71. 
4  See Kate E. Pickett & Richard G. Wilkinson, Income Inequality and Health: A Causal 
Review, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 316, 316 (2015) (noting that various world leaders, including the 
U.S. President, the Pope, and the U.K. Prime Minister have all identified inequality as one of the 
most important problems of our time); see also Eduardo Porter, Income Inequality Is Costing the 
U.S. on Social Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2015, at B1 (“The bloated incarceration rates and rock-
bottom life expectancy, the unraveling families and the stagnant college graduation rates amount 
to an existential threat to the nation’s future.”). 
5  Inequality, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010). 
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are very important, however. Legal scholars, for example, have written 
extensively about the effects of racial and gender inequality.6 While these are 
important forms of inequality, this Article focuses on a different kind of 
inequality: economic inequality, specifically wealth inequality. Wealth 
inequality has not been the focus of as much legal scholarship as other forms of 
inequality.7 It has, however, been extensively studied in fields like economics, 
political science, sociology, psychology, and public health.8 That research 
demonstrates that the adverse consequences of high economic inequality are 
profound. Highly unequal societies have slower economic growth than more 
equal societies.9 High economic inequality also causes a wide variety of health 
problems, including lower life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, and 
higher rates of mental illness.10 It is associated with numerous societal problems, 
including lower rates of trust, lower social cohesion, and higher rates of violent 
crime.11 There is also growing evidence that high levels of inequality result in 
environmental degradation.12 Finally, high rates of inequality undermine 
democracy.13 
High rates of economic inequality do not just mean that some people 
have more money than others. The consequences of high levels of inequality are 
stark. It undermines the economy, society, public health, and even democracy 
itself. Our government has a duty to maintain the economy, society, public 
health, and its own democratic character.14 By undermining the general welfare, 
6  For example, the phrase “gender discrimination” has appeared in the titles of 135 law review 
articles. The phrase “racial discrimination” has appeared in the titles of 338 articles. By 
comparison, the phrase “economic inequality” has appeared in the titles of 58 articles, and the 
specific phrase “wealth inequality” has appeared in the title of only 19 articles. All searches were 
conducted using LexisAdvance on September 1, 2019. Searches were conducted on those 
documents appearing in the “Law Reviews and Journals” database. 
7  See supra note 6. Having said that, some of the most relevant legal contributions to this field 
include the following: Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks 
and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419 (2015); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Economic 
Inequality, 35 LAW & INEQ. 265 (2017); Brendan A. Cappiello, The Price of Inequality and the 
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 401 
(2013); John J. Chung, Wealth Inequality as Explained by Quantitative Easing and Law’s Inertia, 
85 UMKC L. REV. 275 (2017); Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American 
Constitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261 (2015); Thomas W. Mitchell, 
Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849 (2013). 
8  See infra Part III (describing the extensive literature on economic inequality in other fields). 
9  See infra Section III.C. 
10  See infra Section III.D. 
11  See infra Section III.A. 
12  See infra Section III.E. 
13  See infra Section III.B. 
14  See infra Part V. 
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high economic inequality becomes a proper subject of governmental action.15 
Thus, the government should take action to rein in high levels of economic 
inequality before it undermines society as a whole. 
It should not come as a surprise to anyone that the U.S. is currently 
experiencing extremely high levels of economic inequality. Rates of economic 
inequality have been growing since the 1980s and have now reached levels not 
seen since the “Gilded Age” of the 1920s.16 This is not a singularly U.S. 
affliction. Economic inequality has been growing all over the world.17 But the 
U.S. has higher levels of inequality than any other advanced democracy.18 The 
consequences of that can be seen everywhere. As predicted by the research on 
economic inequality, the U.S. has a lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality 
rates, and higher rates of violent crime than more equal countries.19 In some 
ways, living in the U.S. today is more like living in a developing country than a 
rich nation.20 And as inequality continues to increase, the effects are likely to 
grow worse. Economic inequality now represents an existential threat to U.S. 
society.21 
It is for this reason that this Article proposes amending the Constitution 
to limit further increases in wealth inequality.22 To be clear, this proposed 
Amendment does not try to simply eliminate or outlaw inequality. Rather, it 
imposes an obligation on the U.S. government to assess the impact on wealth 
inequality of any new laws or rules.23 It then prohibits the government from 
passing laws that increase inequality unless the government identifies an 
important governmental purpose that justifies that increase.24 While this will not 
automatically eliminate existing inequality, it would make it very unlikely that 
wealth inequality will continue to increase. And, in the long run, it will probably 
lead to lower levels of wealth inequality.25 This would result in greater trust in 
government and society, better public health, and greater economic growth. It 
would, in effect, make the U.S. a better place to live for everybody. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II defines the various forms of 
economic inequality. Part III summarizes the research on economic inequality 
across a number of different fields. The state of inequality in the U.S. today is 
15  See infra Part V. 
16  See infra Part IV. 
17  See infra text accompanying note 157. 
18  See infra text accompanying note 147. 
19  See infra text accompanying notes 158–164. 
20  See infra text accompanying notes 176–186. 
21  See supra text accompanying notes 2–4. 
22  See infra Part VI. 
23  See infra Section VI.B. 
24  See infra Section VI.F. 
25  See infra text accompanying notes 229–235. 
2019] WEALTH INEQUALITY AMENDMENT 5 
examined in Part IV. Part V explains why it is necessary for the government to 
take an active role in limiting wealth inequality. Part VI proposes an Amendment 
to the Constitution to address the threat of rising wealth inequality and discusses 
the provisions of the proposed Amendment. This Article’s conclusions are 
presented in Part VII. 
II. DEFINING INEQUALITY
There are three different kinds of inequality discussed in this Article: 
income inequality, wealth inequality, and economic inequality. While the 
inequality literature sometimes treats these terms as being interchangeable, they 
have distinct meanings. 
Income inequality refers to differences in income between different 
members of a society. Income is usually defined as all money earned by a 
household (including cash transfers like food stamps or tax credits) in a given 
year minus any taxes paid.26 Income inequality is usually measured either using 
a Gini coefficient or the P90/P10 ratio.27 The Gini coefficient for income 
inequality represents the amount of inequality as a number between zero (perfect 
equality—everyone has the same income) and one (perfect inequality—one 
person has all the income).28 Higher Gini coefficients indicate higher levels of 
inequality. Income inequality is also sometimes expressed in terms of the 
P90/P10 ratio. This compares the income of the person at the 90th percentile of 
the income distribution to the person at the 10th percentile of the income 
distribution.29 The greater the ratio of the income of the 90th percentile to the 
10th percentile, the more unequal the distribution of income in society. 
Wealth inequality focuses on differences in overall wealth rather than 
differences in income. Wealth is defined as total assets owned by a household 
minus debts or liabilities.30 It includes pension wealth.31 Wealth inequality is also 
measured using both the Gini coefficient and the P90/P10 ratio.32 The higher the 
26  See, e.g., Jonathan Fisher & Timothy M. Smeeding, Income Inequality, PATHWAYS: A MAG.
ON POVERTY, INEQ. & SOC. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE), 2016, at 32; OECD, OECD FACTBOOK 2011-
2012: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS 80 (2011). 
27  Fisher & Smeeding, supra note 26. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 32–34. 
 30  Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: 
Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 525 (2016) (“Wealth is the 
current market value of all the assets owned by households net of all their debts.”); Gabriel 
Zucman, Wealth Inequality, PATHWAYS: A MAG. ON POVERTY, INEQ. & SOC. POL’Y (SPECIAL 
ISSUE), 2016, at 39. 
31  Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 525–26; Zucman, supra note 30. 
32  See supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (describing the Gini coefficient and the P90/P10 
ratio). 
6 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 
Gini coefficient or the P90/P10 ratio the more unequally wealth is distributed in 
a given society. Wealth inequality is generally much higher than income 
inequality.33 This is because income inequality has a “snowballing effect” on 
wealth inequality as those with the highest incomes save at higher rates.34 This 
“snowballing effect” has dramatically affected the distribution of wealth in the 
U.S. since the late 1970s.35 
Income inequality and wealth inequality measure different things, 
although both can be used as proxies for economic inequality. In terms of 
understanding the real level of inequality in the U.S., however, wealth inequality 
is a better measure of overall inequality than income inequality. There are several 
reasons to focus on wealth inequality. First, the correlation between income and 
wealth is low, suggesting that the impact of wealth inequality is separate from 
the impact of income inequality.36 In addition, there are benefits associated with 
wealth that do not necessarily accrue to income, like long-term financial 
security.37 Moreover, wealth inequality is significantly higher than income 
inequality.38 Thus looking only at income inequality will tend to underestimate 
the overall level of inequality in society. And finally, at least for some problems, 
wealth inequality appears to have worse consequences than income inequality.39 
For these reasons, wealth inequality is a better measure of overall inequality than 
income inequality because it more accurately captures the true state of economic 
inequality in the U.S.40 
As a result, this Article will focus on the effects of wealth inequality 
where possible. However, less is known about wealth inequality than income 
inequality because there is less reliable data about wealth inequality.41 So, even 
33  See Kathryn N. Neckerman & Florencia Torche, Inequality: Causes and Consequences, 33 
ANN. REV. SOC. 335, 338 (2007) (“Wealth is much more unequally distributed than income.”); 
Saez & Zucman, supra note 30 at 521; see also Mitchell, supra note 7, at 856. 
34  See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 531. 
35  Id. at 521. 
 36  See Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 63, 65 (2000) (“Omitting wealth from studies of inequality leaves an important part of 
the . . . story untold.”); Alexandra Killewald et al., Wealth Inequality and Accumulation, 43 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 379, 390 (2017) (“Thus, our results also confirm that . . . wealth remains distinct, even 
from long-term measures of income.”). 
37  See Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 64. 
38  See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 39  See infra text accompanying note 116 (finding that wealth inequality produces a greater drag 
on economic growth than income inequality). 
40  See Cappiello, supra note 7, at 403–04 (arguing that wealth inequality is “more problematic” 
than income inequality); Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 64 (noting that “recent evidence 
suggests that inequality is much worse if wealth is taken into account”). 
41  See Facundo Alvaredo et al., WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT 2018, at 206 (“Unfortunately 
relatively little is . . . known about the recent evolution of wealth inequality at a global level. 
Wealth inequality data discussed in public debates up to now essentially relied on sources which 
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though wealth inequality is a better measure of overall inequality, this Article 
will also cite research that discusses the effects of income inequality. 
Economic inequality is a broader concept than either income inequality 
or wealth inequality and includes the totality of ways in which people’s economic 
opportunities are different.42 Income and wealth inequality make up a large part 
of economic inequality, but it also includes other ways in which people’s 
economic opportunities are different.43 Economic inequality (in its broadest 
sense) is difficult to measure, however, and it is most often measured by 
differences in income or wealth.44 For that reason, the literature often treats 
economic inequality as being synonymous with income or wealth inequality.45 
The lax approach to terminology in the literature is somewhat 
problematic. Economic inequality is broader than income or wealth inequality, 
but this Article will follow the convention in the literature and treat all three 
terms as being largely synonymous, at least when discussing that literature (i.e., 
in Part III). But when it comes to discussing the proposed constitutional 
amendment (i.e., in Part VI), this Article will use specific terms rather than 
do not allow for a sound analysis of wealth dynamics.”); Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 64 
(noting that income is “the most commonly studied indicator of financial wellbeing” because of 
the availability of “accurate data on wages and salaries”). 
42  See Hari Bapuji, Individuals, Interactions and Institutions: How Economic Inequality 
Affects Organizations, 68 HUM. REL. 1059, 1061 (2015) (noting that economic inequality 
represents a “broader conceptualization” than income or wealth inequality and could include 
inequalities in opportunities, education, health or social status); Amartya K. Sen, From Income 
Inequality to Economic Inequality, 64 S. ECON. J. 384, 398 (1997) (arguing that economic 
inequality is broader than income inequality and includes “influences on individual well-being and 
freedom that are economic in nature but that are not captured by the simple statistics of incomes 
and commodity holdings.”); How Is Economic Inequality Defined?, EQUALITY TR., 
https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/how-economic-inequality-defined (last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
43  Cf. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 284–85 (discussing the difference between poverty and 
economic inequality). 
44  See How Is Economic Inequality Defined?, supra note 42; see also Nancy Bermeo, Does 
Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality?, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 21, 22 (2009) (defining 
economic inequality as “a measure of the distribution of material resources that emerges from the 
ranking of all the economic actors . . . according to the amount of material resources that they 
possess”). 
45  See, e.g., Bapuji, supra note 42, at 1061 (“It is common to find economic inequality being 
used interchangeably with income inequality and wealth inequality . . . .”); Stéphane Côté et al., 
High Economic Inequality Leads Higher-Income Individuals to Be Less Generous, 112 PNAS 
15838, 15838 (2015) (defining economic inequality as “the extent to which wealth is concentrated 
in the hands of a small proportion of the population”); B. Keith Payne et al., Economic Inequality 
Increases Risk Taking, 114 PNAS 4643, 4643 (2017) (defining inequality as “the variance in an 
income distribution (as is measured using measures such as the Gini coefficient)”); Frederick Solt, 
Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 48, 51–52 (2008) 
[hereinafter Solt, Democratic Political Engagement] (treating income inequality as a measure of 
economic inequality). But see Sen, supra note 42, at 384–85 (arguing that economic inequality is 
significantly broader than income inequality and that the focus on income inequality is an 
“inadequate” way of assessing economic inequality). 
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treating all three forms of inequality as if they are interchangeable. In particular, 
it will focus on wealth inequality rather than the related concept of economic 
inequality. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH LEVELS OF INEQUALITY
This section will review the literature about the effects of economic 
inequality. Economic inequality has been studied across many fields and this 
section attempts to synthesize that vast and diverse body of work. The papers 
discussed below come from a variety of different fields including economics, 
political science, sociology, psychology, public health, and ecology. 
Moreover, the discussion below focuses on empirical studies of the 
effects of inequality. This is important because it is often possible to come up 
with multiple plausible predictions about the effect of inequality. For example, 
in political science, there has been a debate about the effect of inequality on 
voting.46 One hypothesis is that as economic inequality increases, the rich will 
dominate the political agenda, which will push issues that affect the poor off the 
agenda, and ultimately result in lower voting rates among poorer citizens.47 
Another competing hypothesis is that as inequality widens, the increasing 
differences between rich and poor will motivate poorer citizens to vote in larger 
numbers.48 Both theories seem plausible, but they can’t both be true. The only 
way to know which hypothesis holds true in the real world is to test them against 
the evidence. 
As it turns out, the evidence indicates that increased economic inequality 
reduces voting by the poorest members of society.49 But in the absence of 
evidence, both theories sound like they could be true. This highlights the need 
not just for plausible theories about the effects of inequality but also for empirical 
methods that test those theories. For that reason, this section focuses on empirical 
work (i.e., articles that test their theories against the evidence, often using 
statistical methods to do so). As a result, the discussion below is both multi-
disciplinary and empirical in its approach. 
There are many ways one could divide and categorize the ways in which 
inequality harms society. This Article has opted to classify them under five 
headings: societal effects, democratic effects, effects on economic growth, public 
46  See Frederick Solt, Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the 
Schattschneider Hypothesis, 32 POL. BEHAV. 285, 286–88 (2010) [hereinafter Solt, Testing the 
Schattschneider Hypothesis] (describing different theories about how inequality could affect 
voting patterns). 
47  Id. at 286–87. 
48  Id. at 288. 
 49  Id. at 294–97; see also Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 57 (noting 
that high levels of inequality depress electoral participation by the poor rather than increasing 
support for redistribution). 
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health effects, and environmental effects. Each subsection below addresses one 
of those groupings. 
A. The Effect of Inequality on Society
There are numerous ways in which inequality tears at the fabric of 
society. Inequality is associated with lower levels of social cohesion.50 For 
example, studies show that people in more unequal societies show higher levels 
of status anxiety and lower levels of trust.51 They also show lower levels of 
concern for social harmony and are less willing to help others.52 Higher levels of 
inequality also result in less participation in civic life.53 And, as inequality has 
increased, our neighborhoods have been economically segregated as the wealthy 
increasingly live apart from both the middle class and the poor.54 Finally, it seems 
that the more unequal the society, the less happy its members.55 
And the adverse effects extend beyond a general decrease in trust, civic 
participation, and happiness. For example, increases in inequality cause increases 
in violent crime.56 This finding may seem startling, but it has been replicated 
50  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 322–23. For an excellent discussion of the 
relationship between inequality, trust, and social cohesion, see Bo Rothstein & Eric M. Uslaner, 
All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust, 58 WORLD POL. 41, 41–53 (2005). 
51  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 323; see also Nicholas R. Buttrick & Shigehiro 
Oishi, The Psychological Consequences of Income Inequality, 11 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 1, 2 (2017) (“Surveys show that the more the income inequality in a given area, the less 
the members of that area trust each other.” (citation omitted)); Rothstein & Uslaner, supra note 50, 
at 47–48 & fig.1 (showing that there is a strong relationship between high levels of inequality and 
lower trust across societies). 
52  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 323. 
53  See Buttrick & Oishi, supra note 51, at 3. 
 54  See Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 344 (“Although inequality across regions has 
declined, the affluent and the poor have become more segregated from each other across 
metropolitan areas, municipalities, and neighborhoods.”). 
55  See Buttrick & Oishi, supra note 51, at 5 (noting that studies have found that high inequality 
is associated with lower levels of happiness within society); Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, 
at 342–43 (noting that studies have found that high inequality is correlated with lower levels of life 
satisfaction). 
56  See Mario Coccia, Economic Inequality Can Generate Unhappiness that Leads to Violent 
Crime in Society, 4 INT’L J. HAPPINESS & DEV. 1, 5 (2018) (noting that “there is a growing 
consensus” that inequality can cause increases in violent crime); Pablo Fajnzylber et al., Inequality 
and Violent Crime, 45 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2002) (“Crime rates and inequality are positively correlated 
within countries and, particularly, between countries, and this correlation reflects causation from 
inequality to crime rates, even after controlling for other crime determinants.”); see also Hector 
Gutierrez Rufrancos et al., Income Inequality and Crime: A Review and Explanation of the Time-
Series Evidence, 1 SOC. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013) (finding a strong correlation between income 
inequality and violent crime). 
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many times.57 And it is not just violent crime that is affected by inequality. 
Property crime is also “very strongly” related to income inequality.58 As one 
researcher has noted, a decrease in income inequality “is associated with a 
sizeable reduction in crime.”59 
High levels of inequality are also correlated with poor educational 
outcomes for children. In one study of 23 high-income countries, higher 
inequality was associated with lower math scores, lower reading scores, lower 
science scores, and lower enrollment in higher education.60 The same is true in 
the U.S., where educational performance decreases and the likelihood of 
dropping out of school increases as income inequality increases.61 Nor is the 
effect on children limited to education. Across high-income countries, high 
levels of inequality are negatively correlated with child wellbeing as a whole 
(i.e., as inequality increases child wellbeing decreases).62 
Unequal societies also cause rich people to become less generous to 
others.63 Research indicates that the rich show higher levels of entitlement and 
narcissism,64 as well as a greater tendency to engage in self-serving unethical 
behavior.65 This may be related to the finding, discussed below, that increasing 
inequality increases corruption.66 Higher inequality is also associated with higher 
57  See Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 343 (noting that “[m]any but not all of these 
studies find crime rates are higher in areas with higher income inequality”); Pickett & Wilkinson, 
supra note 4, at 318 (noting that this finding has been replicated many times). 
58  Rufrancos et al., supra note 56. 
59  Id. 
 60  See Kate E. Pickett & Richard G. Wilkinson, Child Wellbeing and Income Inequality in Rich 
Societies: Ecological Cross Sectional Study, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 1080 (2007) [hereinafter Ecological 
Cross Sectional Study]. Not all of the findings were statistically significant, but the results for the 
math scores and further education were significant. Even for the ones that were not significant, 
however, it is striking that all of the educational variables were negatively correlated with 
inequality (i.e., as inequality increased educational attainment decreased). 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  See Côté et al., supra note 45. 
 64  See Paul K. Piff, Wealth and the Inflated Self: Class, Entitlement, and Narcissism, 40 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 34 (2013). 
65  See Paul K. Piff et al., Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior, 109 
PNAS 4086 (2012). This may also be a function of lower levels of trust within society. See Buttrick 
& Oishi, supra note 51, at 3 (“People who trust others less are more likely to engage in unethical 
behavior . . . .”). 
66  See infra text accompanying notes 101–103. 
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levels of risk taking.67 For example, highly unequal societies have higher rates 
of drug use68 and gambling.69 
Greater inequality also decreases social mobility.70 This means that 
children of poor parents are more likely to become poor adults, while the children 
of rich parents are likely to remain rich.71 As a result, “rags to riches” life 
trajectories are much less common in highly unequal societies. And inequality 
has enormous adverse public health effects, which are discussed below.72 By 
virtually any measure (crime, happiness, social cohesion and trust, social 
mobility, drug use, child wellbeing, etc.) unequal societies are worse places to 
live than more equal societies. 
B. The Effect of Inequality on Democracy
High levels of economic inequality also have wide-ranging impacts on 
the health of our democracy. To begin with, higher levels of inequality lower the 
rate at which people vote in the U.S.73 Moreover, the effects are asymmetrical. 
High levels of inequality decrease voting rates of the poorest more than rates for 
the wealthiest.74 While the composition of the electorate is always skewed in 
favor of the wealthy (who vote at higher rates than the poor at all levels of 
inequality), this trend becomes even more pronounced as economic inequality 
increases.75 High levels of inequality also decrease both interest in politics and 
discussion of politics, particularly for the poorest members of society.76 
Highly unequal societies also have less trust in democratic 
government.77 While this result is not unique to the U.S., there is evidence that 
high levels of inequality are undermining our commitment to democracy. For 
67  See Payne et al., supra note 45. 
68  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 320. 
 69  See Elizabeth A. Freund & Irwin L. Morris, Gambling and Income Inequality in the States, 
24 POL’Y STUD. J. 265 (2006). 
70  See Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational 
Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2013); Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 321. 
71  Mitchell, supra note 7, at 851. 
72  See infra Section III.D. 
 73  See Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra note 46, at 294–97 (finding that 
states with the highest levels of inequality in the study had voting rates approximately 20% lower 
than states with the lowest levels of inequality). 
74  Id. at 294–97; see also Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 56–57. 
75  See Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra note 46, at 294–297. 
76  See Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 54–56. 
 77  See Roberto Stefan Foa & Yascha Mounk, The End of the Consolidation Paradigm: A 
Response to Our Critics, J. DEMOCRACY, June 24, 2017, at 1, 15 fig.5 (showing that there is a strong 
correlation between income inequality and attitudes towards democracy with the electorate in 
highly unequal societies becoming increasingly disenchanted with democracy). 
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example, satisfaction with U.S. democracy is declining over time, particularly 
amongst the young.78 By 2011, less than 30% of young Americans thought that 
democracy was a good way to run the country.79 In response to a 2016 survey, 
46% of respondents said they had “never had” faith in U.S. democracy or had 
“lost” that faith.80 This suggests that growing inequality is an existential threat to 
democracy itself.81 
A big part of the problem is that our government has been captured by 
moneyed interests. It is much more responsive to the needs of the rich than the 
needs of the middle class or the poor.82 This has occurred, in part, because the 
wealthy are more politically active than those who are less well off, but also 
because they give far more money to politicians and political organizations and 
have far more access to public officials.83 The influence of the affluent might not 
78  Id. at fig.1. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 6. 
 81  Id. at 3–5 (arguing that stable democracies can “deconsolidate”—transition to a 
non-democratic form of government—if support for democracy becomes too low); id. at 17 (noting 
that “countries in which more than 20 percent of respondents express cynicism of democratic 
governance have, historically, been highly susceptible to the rise of authoritarian parties, 
candidates and political movements”). 
82  See Bermeo, supra note 44, at 25 (2009) (noting that “a raft of convincing research shows 
that public policies more often reflect the preferences of the wealthy than those of the average 
voter” (citation omitted)); Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB.
OPINION Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 778 (2005) (finding that the government is very responsive to the 
policy preferences of the wealthy and almost totally unresponsive to the policy preferences of poor 
and middle-income people when their policy preferences diverge from those of the wealthy); 
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, 
and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 572 (2014) (finding that average citizens have “little 
or no independent influence on policy” while economic elites have a “substantial, highly 
significant, independent impact on policy”); Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 345 (noting 
that “elected officials in the United States are far more responsive to their affluent constituents than 
to the middle class or the poor”); Benjamin I. Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences 
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 51 (2013) (noting that there is now significant 
evidence that “the wealthiest Americans exert more political influence than their less fortunate 
fellow citizens do”); cf. Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign 
Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 120–21 (2005) (finding that business leaders have a “strong, 
consistent, and perhaps lopsided influence” on U.S. foreign policy while the views of the public 
have “little or no significant effect on government officials.”). 
83  See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political 
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152, 
175–78 (2010) (noting that beginning in the mid-1970s moneyed business interests became very 
successful at organizing in ways that permitted them to influence the policy-making process in the 
United States through both direct giving to politicians and through massive spending on lobbying 
efforts); Page et al., supra note 82, at 53–54; Jeffrey A. Winters & Benjamin I. Page, Oligarchy in 
the United States?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 731, 740–43 (2009) (describing ways in which the wealthy 
are able to influence government policy, including lobbying). 
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be a huge problem if the wealthiest Americans and poor to middle-class 
Americans agreed on the role of government,84 but they do not.85 
The wealthiest Americans say that budget deficits are the most important 
problem facing the U.S.86 And they would prefer to cut government spending on 
Social Security, food stamps, health care, and environmental protection.87 Most 
Americans do not agree. They see jobs and the economy as the most important 
issue,88 and support increasing government spending on Social Security, health 
care, and the environment.89 
There are also significant differences on tax policy. The wealthiest 
Americans do not want to increase the marginal income tax rate or the estate 
tax.90 In contrast, most Americans support a higher marginal income tax rate on 
the wealthy as well as an increase in the estate tax.91 Finally, the wealthiest 
Americans are adamantly opposed to having the government take active steps to 
reduce economic inequality in the U.S.92 
84  See Page et al., supra note 82, at 52 (noting that “[i]f . . . the policy preferences of the 
affluent were much the same as everyone else’s, then their unequal influence would make little 
practical difference” (citation omitted)). 
85  See generally Page et al., supra note 82 (finding that the views of the wealthiest Americans 
diverge from those of the public); see also Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 181–82 (2010) 
(noting that wealthy Americans are “less supportive of economic redistribution and measures to 
provide economic security” than the median voter). 
86  See Page et al., supra note 82, at 55. 
87  Id. at 56. 
88  Id. at 55–56. 
 89  Id. at 56; see also Little Public Support for Reductions in Federal Spending, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/little-public-support-for-reductions-in-
federal-spending/ (finding that large numbers of Americans support increases in spending for 
Medicare, health care, and Social Security, while very few Americans support reducing spending 
on those areas). 
90  See Page et al., supra note 82, at 61–62. 
 91  Id. at 62; see also Matthew Sheffield, Poll: A Majority of Americans Support Raising the 
Top Tax Rate to 70 Percent, HILL (Jan. 15, 2019), https://thehill.com/hilltv/what-americas-
thinking/425422-a-majority-of-americans-support-raising-the-top-tax-rate-to-70 (reporting on a 
recent public opinion poll that showed nearly 60% of registered voters favored increasing the 
highest marginal income tax rate to 70%); Growing Partisan Divide Over Fairness of the Nation’s 
Tax System, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/04/growing-
partisan-divide-over-fairness-of-the-nations-tax-system/ (showing that a majority of American 
believe the U.S. tax system is not fair and that more than 60% of Americans believe that the wealthy 
and corporations do not pay enough in taxes); Taxes, GALLUP, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1714/taxes.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) (showing that, in public 
opinion polls conducted over more than twenty five years, a majority of Americans consistently 
indicate that “upper-income people” and “corporations” pay too little in federal taxes). 
92  See Page et al., supra note 82, at 63–64 (noting that 87% of the wealthy said that the 
government did not have a responsibility to reduce inequality and that 83% of the wealthy said that 
the government should not use taxes to redistribute wealth). 
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While there are some areas of agreement,93 the wealthiest Americans 
have significantly different views from average Americans about a number of 
important issues, including the deficit, health care and Social Security spending, 
and tax policy. Moreover, the differences become stronger the richer you are. 
Americans with more than $40 million in wealth were significantly more likely 
to favor cutting social programs and reducing regulation of businesses than those 
with only $5 million in wealth.94 As Professor Page suggests, these differences 
in views and the ability to influence the government help explain why marginal 
tax rates have gone down and cutting Social Security always seems to be on the 
agenda, despite the fact that these policies do not have widespread support.95 
The wealthiest Americans have been very successful at securing policies 
that advance their wealth and blocking proposals that would reduce that wealth.96 
Average tax rates, particularly for the wealthiest Americans, have dropped 
dramatically since the 1970s.97 And the research suggests that is the result of 
intensive efforts by interest groups funded by the wealthiest Americans, who 
have been successful in “keeping tax cuts on the agenda and shaping policy to 
focus the gains of tax-policy changes on those at the very top of the income 
distribution.”98 The reality of the American political system today is that it is one 
in which the wealthy use their influence over policy to channel ever larger 
proportions of the country’s wealth to themselves, and the poor and middle class 
are largely powerless to prevent it.99 
Looking beyond the U.S., high levels of inequality have been linked to 
other ills, including more human rights abuses, a greater acceptance of 
93  Both the wealthiest Americans and the public as a whole support government spending on 
both public infrastructure, scientific research and education. See Page et al., supra note 82, at tbl.1. 
94  Page et al., supra note 82, at 64–65. 
 95  See Page et al., supra note 82, at 68; see also Gilens & Page, supra note 82, at 576 (noting 
that “even when fairly large majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not 
get it” when those policy changes are opposed by economic elites). 
96  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 435–61 (describing how the wealthy have been able to exert 
considerable power over the government, particularly over issues that would affect their own 
wealth like tax policy or corporate regulation); Feldman, supra note 7, at 312–13 (describing how 
corporate interests are able to block or otherwise undermine legislation that would adversely affect 
their profitability). 
97  See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 184 fig.5. 
98  Id. at 184–85. 
 99  See id. at 189–92 (noting that wealthy business interests were able to prevent changes that 
would have reined in executive compensation and that the rise in executive compensation in the 
1990s contributed significantly to inequality); see also Feldman, supra note 7, at 306 (“With 
ever-increasing proficiency, corporations manipulate elections and government for their own 
advantage—benefiting the respective corporations as well as corporate business in toto.” (citation 
omitted)); Growing Partisan Divide Over Fairness of the Nation’s Tax System, supra note 91 
(showing that more than 60% of Americans believe that the U.S. economic system unfairly favors 
powerful interests at the expense of most Americans). 
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authoritarian rule, more influence peddling, and the erosion of the rule of law.100 
One study found that high levels of inequality caused increases in corruption.101 
This, in turn, can cause further increases in inequality.102 “As a result, many 
societies are likely to be trapped in vicious circles of inequality and 
corruption.”103 
Inequality also effects whether democracies rise or fall.104 Greater 
inequality in society makes it less likely that countries will transition to a stable 
democracy.105 And high levels of inequality are associated with the failure of 
young democracies.106 But, inequality is not just a problem for young or 
transitional democracies. There is evidence that even stable democracies can be 
undermined by high levels of inequality.107 These findings led one scholar to 
conclude that “persistently high economic inequality harms the quality of 
democracy in profound ways.”108 
C. The Effect of Inequality on the Economy
Inequality also affects the economy. There is evidence that highly 
unequal societies have lower rates of economic growth than more equal 
societies.109 This relationship has been studied extensively over the last several 
100  See Bermeo, supra note 44, at 25; see also Feldman, supra note 7, at 332 (noting that “gross 
inequality in a pluralist democratic regime” undermines the rule of law (citation omitted)). 
101  See Jong-sung You & Sanjeev Khagram, A Comparative Study of Inequality and 
Corruption, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 136, 151 (2005) (“Thus, the weight of the evidence supports our 
hypothesis that inequality increases corruption.” (citation omitted)). 
102  Id. at 153 (“[I]nequality causes higher levels of corruption, and higher levels of corruption 
intensify inequality.”). 
103  Id. 
 104  See Florian Jung & Uwe Sunde, Income, Inequality, and the Stability of Democracy—
Another Look at the Lipset Hypothesis, 35 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 52 (2014). 
105  See Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 52. 
 106  See Ethan B. Kapstein & Nathan Converse, Poverty, Inequality and Democracy: Why 
Democracies Fail, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 57 (2008). 
107  See Foa & Mounk, supra note 77, at fig.5 (noting that there is a strong correlation between 
income inequality and attitudes towards democracy with the electorate in highly unequal societies 
becoming increasingly disenchanted with democracy). 
108  Bermeo, supra note 44, at 24; see also Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 
45, at 58. 
109  See, e.g., Dierk Herzer & Sebastian Vollmer, Inequality and Growth: Evidence From Panel 
Cointegration, 10 J. ECON. INEQ. 489, 501 (2012) (finding that “the long-run effect of inequality 
on growth is negative” and that this relationship holds true for rich and poor countries as well as 
democratic and non-democratic countries). 
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decades.110 While most studies have found a negative relationship between 
inequality and growth,111 that result is not universal112 and some of the studies 
finding a relationship have been criticized on methodological grounds.113 A 
recent meta-analysis by Neves et al., however, re-analyzed the existing empirical 
studies of the relationship between inequality and growth.114 While Neves et al. 
found some problems with the prior studies,115 their meta-analysis concluded that 
inequality does have a negative effect on growth, particularly in developing 
countries, and that wealth inequality has a greater negative effect than income 
inequality.116 
The takeaway from this research is that inequality, particularly wealth 
inequality, has a negative impact on economic growth.117 This may be, in part, 
because high levels of inequality decrease productivity.118 For example, there is 
evidence that high levels of pay inequality within businesses can decrease 
cooperation, diminish job satisfaction, hamper innovation, increase turnover, and 
have a “negative effect on individual, team and organizational performance.”119 
These findings directly contradict an argument frequently made by 
wealthy interests that increasing taxes on the wealthy will reduce economic 
110  See Pedro Cunha Neves et al., A Meta-Analytic Reassessment of the Effects of Inequality on 
Growth, 78 WORLD DEV. 386, 387–88 (2016) (summarizing the history of empirical study of the 
relationship between inequality and growth from the mid-1990s to the present). 
111  Id. at 390 (noting that 36 of their estimates found a negative relationship between inequality 
and growth while only 13 found a positive relationship); see also Erik Thorbecke & Chutatong 
Charumilind, Economic Inequality and Its Socioeconomic Impact, 30 WORLD DEV. 1477, 1482 
(2002) (reviewing a number of studies that have found a negative correlation between inequality 
and economic growth). 
112  See, e.g., Robert J. Barro, Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, 5 J. ECON. 
GROWTH 5 (2000) (finding that inequality impeded growth in developing countries but had a 
positive correlation with growth in high income countries). 
113  See Neves et al., supra note 110. 
114  Id. at 388–90 (describing how the data for the meta-analysis was collected). 
 115  For example, they found some evidence of publication bias in the magnitude of the results 
that may have inflated the reported effect sizes. Id. at 392–93. 
116  Id. at 398. 
117  Id.; see also Andrew Berg et al., Redistribution, Inequality and Growth: New Evidence, 23 
J. ECON. GROWTH 259 (2018) (finding that lower inequality is correlated with higher rates of
economic growth); Vicente Royuela et al., The Short-Run Relationship Between Inequality and
Growth: Evidence From the OECD Regions During the Great Recession, 53 REGIONAL STUD.
(forthcoming 2019) (finding a negative relationship between inequality and growth among OECD
countries during the 2003–2013 period).
118  See Bapuji, supra note 42, at 1068. 
119  Id. 
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growth by reducing the incentive for the rich to earn more.120 In reality, 
decreasing taxes on the wealthy increases inequality,121 which leads to lower 
growth.122 Thus, the evidence suggests that increasing taxes on the wealthy is a 
better route to long-term economic growth because increasing taxes on the 
wealthy reduces inequality, and a reduction in inequality will probably lead to 
higher long-term growth rates. 
D. The Effect of Inequality on Public Health
The health effects of high economic inequality are stark,123 particularly 
in affluent countries like the U.S. Affluent countries with high levels of economic 
inequality are simply less healthy than more equal countries.124 Highly unequal 
countries suffer from a variety of poor health outcomes including lower life 
expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, higher teenage birth rates, higher 
rates of drug use, higher rates of obesity, and higher rates of mental illness.125 
The size of the effects are large, with high rates of inequality resulting in a 
tripling of the rates of mental illness and obesity and years less of life 
expectancy.126 This association has been found in hundreds of studies that have 
compared outcomes in many countries, at different levels of development, over 
a period of more than 30 years.127 As some of the leading researchers in this area 
have said: “There can now be no doubt that worse health is . . . associated with 
greater inequality.”128 This association is so well known in the public health and 
120  See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Tax Cuts, Sold as Fuel for Growth, Widen Gap Between Rich and 
Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/business/economy/tax-
rates-growth.html (describing arguments made in favor of reducing taxes on the wealthy). 
121  Id. 
122  See supra text accompanying notes 109–116. 
 123  See Richard G. Wilkinson & Kate E. Pickett, Income Inequality and Social Dysfunction, 35 
ANN. REV. SOC. 493, 494 (2009) (reviewing the literature and finding that most of the studies that 
have examined the relationship between inequality and health have concluded that increased 
inequality is associated with worse health outcomes). 
124  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 317–18. This appears to be the case for children 
as well as adults, as child wellbeing tends to decrease as inequality increases. See Ecological Cross 
Sectional Study, supra note 60. 
125  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 320; Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 494–
95. 
126  See Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 494, 505. 
 127  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 317–18 (describing how hundreds of studies 
across a wide variety of countries have shown that countries that are more unequal have poorer 
health). 
128  Id. at 318. 
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epidemiology literature that it even has its own name: “the inequality 
hypothesis.”129 
But there is not just evidence of association, there is also now “strong” 
evidence that inequality causes these adverse health outcomes.130 After several 
decades of research, the evidence is clear that the result of increasing inequality 
is worse health outcomes for everyone, not just the poor.131 As one researcher 
put it, “[i]t appears to be impossible to create a society with high rates of 
economic inequality and good health.”132 
E. The Effect of Inequality on the Environment
There is a consensus that degradation of the environment can worsen 
inequality because the poor are more dependent on the environment than those 
who are well off.133 Thus, they suffer more from pollution and climate change 
than the wealthy.134 But, increasingly, there is evidence that the causation can 
run the other way too—increasing inequality can also have adverse 
environmental impacts.135 While not all of the studies agree on whether there is 
a relationship,136 there is some evidence that greater inequality is associated with 
weaker environmental protection policies and greater biodiversity loss.137 There 
is also evidence that highly unequal affluent societies produce more climate 
change inducing CO2 emissions than more equal societies.138 While there is need 
129  See SV Subramanian & Ichiro Kawachi, Response: In Defence of the Income Inequality 
Hypothesis, 32 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1037 (2003). 
130  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 323; see also Bapuji, supra note 42, at 1063 (“[I]t 
is fair to conclude (based on over 300 peer-reviewed studies) that the relationship between high 
levels of income inequality and poor health has met the epidemiological criteria for 
causality . . . .”). 
131  Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 322 (noting that studies have found that the adverse 
effects of economic inequality, while felt most strongly amongst the poor, “extend to the majority 
of the population”); Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 505 (noting that the adverse health 
and social effects of inequality also impact the top quartile of the population by income). 
132  Danny Dorling, The Mother of Underlying Causes – Economic Ranking and Health 
Inequality, 128 SOC. SCI. & MED. 327, 330 (2015). 
133  See Alexandre Berthe & Luc Elie, Mechanisms Explaining the Impact of Economic 
Inequality on Environmental Deterioration, 116 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 191, 191 (2015). 
134  Id. 
135  Id. 
136  Id. at tbl.1. 
137  Id. at 198. 
 138  See Nicole Grunewald et al., The Trade-Off Between Income Inequality and Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, 142 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 249 (2017) (finding that high levels of inequality increased 
carbon dioxide emissions in middle and high income countries); Andrew Jorgenson et al., Domestic 
Inequality and Carbon Emissions in Comparative Perspective, 31 SOC. F. 770 (2016) (finding that 
inequality is linked with increased carbon emissions in high income countries); Andrew K. 
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for additional research in this area,139 increasing economic inequality is likely to 
have adverse environmental impacts, particularly in affluent countries like the 
United States.140 
IV. INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY
The section above lays out the evidence about the adverse effects of 
inequality. Those consequences are profound. Highly unequal societies can 
expect to have high crime rates, low social cohesion and happiness, poor public 
health, slow economic growth, a poorly functioning democracy, and 
environmental degradation. But how bad is inequality in the U.S.? There is good 
reason to believe that most people don’t understand how bad it really is.141 This 
section briefly reviews the state of inequality in the U.S. today. 
Income inequality in the U.S. has grown dramatically since 1980.142 It 
has also grown in every state within the U.S. over that same time period.143 
Moreover, the more income one has, the more pronounced the changes. While 
families in the top 1% of the U.S. population have seen their income more than 
double since the 1980s, families in the top 0.1% have seen their income 
quadruple over that period.144 Very little of this money has made its way to the 
poor or middle class. Between 1979 and 2005, the average incomes of the poorest 
quintile of the population increased by only 6% in real terms, while the incomes 
of those in the middle quintile increased by only 21%.145 In contrast, the income 
of the richest 1% of households increased by more than 230% over that same 
period.146 As a result of these changes, the U.S. now has greater income 
inequality than any other advanced democracy.147 
Jorgenson et al., Income Inequality and Residential Carbon Emissions in the United States: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 22 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 93 (2015) (finding a link between increased 
inequality and higher carbon emissions in the United States). But see Sebastian Mader, The Nexus 
Between Social Inequality and CO2 Emissions Revisited: Challenging Its Empirical Validity, 89 
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 322 (2018) (arguing that studies showing a positive relationship between 
inequality and carbon dioxide emissions are flawed). 
139  See Berthe & Elie, supra note 133, at 199. 
140  Id. 
 141  See Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America—One Wealth Quintile at a 
Time, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 9 (2011) (finding that most Americans do not understand how 
unequal our society has become). 
142  See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 155–56; Mitchell, supra note 7, at 853–55; 
Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 336–37 (describing the sharp rise in inequality that began 
in the late 1980s). 
143  See Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra note 46, at 290. 
144  See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 83, at 155. 
145  Id. at 157. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 160; see also id. at fig.2. 
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Table 1 below shows the current P90/P10 ratios for all Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) countries.148 The U.S. has 
a ratio of 6.3, which puts the U.S. 34th out of 36 countries. The U.S. has worse 
income inequality than every country in Europe and is only slightly better than 
Chile and Mexico. The OECD also provides information on the Gini coefficients 
of income inequality, and the results are essentially the same.149 
 Table 1 – Income Inequality in OECD Countries 
P90/P10 ratio 
Denmark 2.9 


















United Kingdom 4.2 
Australia 4.3 








148  The data was retrieved from the OECD website on Feb. 13, 2019. Income Inequality, OECD 
DATA, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). The 
data includes only OECD countries and only data on the P90/P10 ratio. 
149  When ranked by Gini coefficients, the U.S. ranks 33rd out of 36 countries. Id. It ranks 
marginally above Turkey, but still ranks below the rest of Europe. Id. 





United States 6.3 
Chile 7 
Mexico 7.2 
Wealth inequality has moved in the same direction as income 
inequality.150 It was very high by the late 1920s but dropped significantly 
thereafter to a low in the early 1980s.151 Since the 1980s, wealth inequality has 
grown precipitously.152 And while the richest 10% of families have benefited 
from this rising inequality, the biggest gains have gone to a relatively small 
number of families at the very top—the richest of the rich.153 
Today, the wealthiest 0.1% of families in the U.S. own approximately 
the same amount of wealth as the bottom 90% of U.S. families put together.154 
This means that the 160 thousand richest families have the same total amount of 
wealth as the bottom 144 million families.155 Or, to put it another way, the bottom 
90% of American families have an average wealth of about $84,000 per family, 
while the richest 0.1% have an average wealth of almost $73 million.156 While 
wealth inequality has risen globally since the 1980s, wealth inequality in the U.S. 
has grown even faster and the U.S. now has some of the highest wealth inequality 
in the world, surpassed only by highly unequal countries like Russia.157 
The U.S. is one of the richest countries in the world.158 Yet the U.S. is 
also one of the most unequal countries.159 The research discussed above in 
Section III indicates that, despite our enormous overall wealth, there ought to be 
150  See Killewald et al., supra note 36, at 383 tbl.1 (showing that wealth inequality has increased 
steadily since the 1980s); see also Keister & Moller, supra note 36, at 67–69 (noting that multiple 
studies have shown that wealth inequality is high in the U.S. and that it has worsened in recent 
decades). 
151  See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 54 fig.6. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 552. 
154  Id. at 551–52. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. at 47 tbl.1. 
 157  See Alvaredo et al., supra note 41, at 206–08 fig.4.2.1 (showing that the U.S. has higher 
wealth inequality than France, China or the United Kingdom, and only slightly lower wealth 
inequality than Russia). 
158  According to data from the OECD, its per capita GDP is surpassed only by a handful of 
countries. See Gross Domestic Product (GDP), OECD DATA, https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gross-
domestic-product-gdp.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
159  See supra Table 1. 
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serious consequences that stem from that inequality. And there are. The U.S. is 
both the most unequal high-income nation and (unsurprisingly) the one with the 
worst health and social outcomes.160 For example, our crime rate is much higher 
than in other rich democracies.161 In addition, infant mortality rates are high162 
and life expectancy is low.163 And the U.S. does extremely poorly on indicators 
of child wellbeing compared to most other rich democracies.164 Overall life 
satisfaction in the U.S. is significantly lower than in much of Europe,165 and we 
have a worse sense of community as well.166 
Social mobility is also lower in the U.S. than in any other rich country.167 
But Americans generally do not recognize this and tend to overestimate the 
160  See Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 123, at 497 fig.1. 
 161  For example, the average homicide rate among OECD countries is 3.6 murders per 100,000 
people. See Safety, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety/ 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2019). This rate in the US is 4.9 murders per 100,000 people. Id. This puts 
the U.S. on par with Chile, which has a murder rate of 4.5 per 100,000. The U.S. is far worse than 
the majority of Europe. Id. For example, murder rates in France are 0.6 per 100,000, while murder 
rates in Germany are 0.4 per 100,000. Id. 
162  The U.S. has 5.9 deaths per 1,000 live births. Infant Mortality Rates, OECD DATA, 
https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/infant-mortality-rates.htm#indicator-chart (last visited Aug. 28, 
2019). This is essentially the same infant mortality rate as Russia. Id. Most European countries 
have much lower rates. For example, the rates in Iceland, Finland, Slovenia, Norway, Estonia, 
Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Ireland are 3 or less deaths per 1,000 live births. Id. 
Essentially, a large number of European states have infant mortality rates half that of the U.S. or 
less. 
163  Life expectancy at birth in the U.S. is 78.60 years. Life Expectancy at Birth, OECD DATA, 
https://data.oecd.org/healthstat/life-expectancy-at-birth.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). This is 
roughly the same as life expectancy in Poland or the Czech Republic. Id. It is more than three years 
less than many European countries, including Switzerland, Spain, Norway, France, and Sweden. 
Id. It is also significantly less than many other advanced democracies, including Japan, Australia, 
Korea, and Canada. 
164  See Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 60. 
 165  Life satisfaction scores in the U.S. are significantly worse than in some European countries, 
like Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and Finland. See Life Satisfaction, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, 
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/life-satisfaction/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). It is better, 
however, than some European countries like Greece, Portugal, or Hungary. Id. Overall, the U.S. 
ranks 15th out of 38 OECD countries on life satisfaction. 
166  According to the OECD, the strength of social networks in the U.S. is relatively low, with 
the U.S. ranking 23 out of 38 OECD countries. Community, OECD BETTER LIFE INDEX, 
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/community/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). Our results put 
us on par with Russia and Japan, and significantly behind Spain, Denmark, Ireland, and Iceland. 
Id. 
167  See Neckerman & Torche, supra note 33, at 39 (“In other words, children of poor families 
are more likely to remain poor, and the children of wealthy families are more likely to remain 
wealthy in the United States than in any other rich country.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 7, at 
861–66 (describing the state of social mobility in the U.S. today). 
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amount of social mobility in our society.168 “Americans believe they live in a 
country that is significantly more equal and upwardly mobile than it actually 
is.”169 Somewhat ironically, Americans would vastly prefer to live in a country 
with the inequality levels of Sweden rather than the U.S.170 
The U.S. also has worse public corruption than most European 
countries.171 Corruption in the U.S. has been getting worse recently172 and is now 
similar to that experienced in the United Arab Emirates or Uruguay.173 U.S. 
democracy is also showing signs of poor health.174 According to one prominent 
measure of democratic health, the U.S. is ranked far below many European 
countries and on par with Belize and Croatia.175 Taken together, these results are 
exactly what one would expect from a highly unequal society. 
The contrast with Denmark and Norway is particularly illuminating. 
Denmark and Norway both have comparable per capita gross domestic product 
(“GDP”) to the U.S.176 but have significantly lower income inequality.177 Their 
168  See Shai Davidai & Thomas Gilovich, How Should We Think About Americans’ Beliefs 
About Economic Mobility?, 13 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 297, 301 (2018) (finding that 
participants, when asked to rank a group of countries by their social mobility, consistently ranked 
the U.S. much higher than its actual rank). 
169  Id. at 302; see also Mitchell, supra note 7, at 869–71 (describing how Americans 
significantly underestimate the amount of inequality in the country). 
170  See Norton & Ariely, supra note 141, at 10 (finding that the Americans in their survey 
preferred the wealth distribution of Sweden over the U.S. by a rate of 92% to 8%). 
171  The U.S. had a corruption score of 71 in the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index created by 
Transparency International. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). The corruption score of the 
U.S. is significantly worse than that of countries like Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
Id. 
172  The scores for the U.S. have fallen pretty consistently over the last four years from a score 
of 76 in 2015 to 71 in 2018. Id. 
173  The U.S. had a corruption score of 71 in 2018. The United Arab Emirates and Uruguay had 
scores of 70. Id. 
174  See supra Section III.B. 
 175  See Freedom in the World 2018, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores (last visited Aug. 29, 
2019). The U.S. had an aggregate score of 86 out of 100, the same as Belize and Croatia. Id. Three 
European countries received scores of 100 out of 100, and even Canada scored 99 out of 100. Id. 
176  Per capita GDP in the U.S. is approximately $58,000 per year. Norway is the same (at 
$58,000), while Denmark is slightly lower (at $51,000). See Gross Domestic Product (GDP), supra 
note 158. 
177  See Income Inequality, supra note 148. On February 8, 2019, Norway and Denmark had 
Gini coefficients of income inequality of 0.26. The U.S. had a Gini coefficient of 0.39. 
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poverty rates are much lower,178 as are their crime rates.179 Life expectancy, on 
the other hand, is higher in Denmark and Norway,180 as is social mobility.181 Life 
satisfaction is also higher than in the U.S.182 They are less corrupt183 and more 
democratic.184 By most measures, Denmark and Norway are simply better places 
to live than the U.S. 
These differences are not accidents. They are the expected result of the 
enormous income and wealth inequality that is present in the U.S. The U.S. may 
be one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but the unequal distribution of 
that wealth has made it a significantly worse place to live than other countries 
with similar levels of overall wealth but a more equal distribution of that wealth. 
In effect, living in the U.S. is, by many measures, more like living in Russia185 
or Chile186 than it is like living in Norway or Denmark. 
While many Americans would likely balk at being compared to Russia 
or Chile rather than other advanced democracies, these comparisons should not 
be surprising. After all, our level of income inequality is quite similar to that in 
Chile,187 and our level of wealth inequality is like that found in Russia.188 Given 
our level of inequality, it makes sense that life in the U.S. is similar to life in 
those two countries. 
V. WHAT TO DO ABOUT INEQUALITY?
One key question that must be answered is whether the government 
could or should do something about inequality. After all, the wealthy are not 
evil.189 They are simply acting in their own interest by seeking to increase their 
178  See Poverty Rate, OECD DATA, https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-
rate.htm#indicator-chart (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
179  The murder rate in Denmark is 0.7 per 100,000. The murder rate in Norway is 0.6 per 
100,000. The rate in the U.S. is 4.9 per 100,000. See Safety, supra note 161. 
180  Life Expectancy at Birth, supra note 163. 
181  See Corak, supra note 70, at 3 fig.1. 
182  Life Satisfaction, supra note 165. 
 183  According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, Denmark is 
the least corrupt country in the world. Norway is not far behind. Both are far ahead of the U.S. See 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, supra note 171. 
184  According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2018 data, Norway has an aggregate 
democracy score of 100, while Norway has a score of 97. The U.S. ranks much farther down the 
list with a score of 86. See Freedom in the World 2018, supra note 175. 
185  The U.S. has essentially the same infant mortality rate as Russia. See supra note 162. 
186  The U.S. actually has a worse murder rate than Chile. See supra note 161. 
187  See supra Table 1. 
188  See supra note 157. 
 189  See Winters & Page, supra note 83, at 738 (rejecting the idea that the wealthy form a “cabal” 
or “conspiracy”). 
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wealth.190 Yet, it is clear that increasing inequality is not harmless.191 There is 
now ample evidence that permitting inequality to grow unchecked has very 
serious consequences. The results of extremely high inequality include poor 
health, a weaker society, slower economic growth, and a weakening of 
democracy.192 There is even some evidence that high levels of inequality degrade 
the environment.193 Moreover, the consequences of extremely high inequality are 
felt throughout society.194 Even the wealthy, who are in many ways insulated 
from the worst effects of inequality by their wealth, suffer some of the adverse 
effects of that inequality. 
But should government take action to limit inequality? The answer is 
emphatically yes.195 After all, what is the purpose of our government? The 
Constitution explicitly states that a key function of our government is to promote 
the general welfare of its citizens.196 Similarly, the Declaration of Independence 
argues that the purpose of government is to secure for its citizens “life, liberty 
and the pursuit of happiness.”197 Other Founding-era documents advocate similar 
190  See id. at 738 (“Though some of [the wealthiest Americans] undoubtedly network with each 
other, most are not even mutually acquainted. They are bound together—if at all—by material self-
interest and political clout, not by social ties.”). 
191  Arguments to the contrary tend towards the ridiculous. For example, John Tamny’s claim 
that surging inequality is “a happy sign” is hard to take seriously. See John Tamny, Surging Wealth 
Inequality Is a Happy Sign that Life Is Becoming Much More Convenient, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2018, 
9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johntamny/2018/11/11/surging-wealth-inequality-is-a-
happy-sign-that-life-is-becoming-much-more-convenient. His argument simply ignores the 
mountain of evidence of the harmful consequences of high levels of inequality. He also presents 
straw man arguments. For example, the claim that surging inequality is desirable because two 
hundred years ago society was more equal, and people’s lives were worse is deeply flawed. The 
comparison that matters is whether people’s lives would be better today with less inequality, not 
whether people’s lives are better now than two hundred years ago despite an increase in inequality. 
192  See supra Part III. 
193  See supra Section III.E. 
194  See supra text accompanying note 131. 
 195  Cf. Bartlett, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that once we recognize the problem of inequality, 
we have a moral obligation to solve it) (“[I]f the problem is that some people have been the 
beneficiaries of a system that is rigged in their favor, the only real solution is that the seemingly 
beneficent assumptions of the system be exposed and discredited, and the system changed.”). 
196  See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that the U.S. government was created, in part, to “promote 
the general Welfare”); id., art. I, § 8 (granting to Congress the power to collect taxes in order to 
“provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States”); see also Feldman, supra note 7, at 264 
(“Ultimately, the constitutional framers . . . sought to enhance the protection of property rights, but 
they simultaneously empowered government to act for the common good.”). 
197  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain 
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure 
these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed . . . .”). 
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positions.198 High levels of inequality undermine these goals. They harm the 
general welfare in many ways, including by slowing economic growth, 
increasing crime, decreasing public health, decreasing trust and social cohesion, 
and lowering citizens’ happiness and life satisfaction. Thus, inequality is a proper 
subject of government action because regulating inequality is in the public 
interest. 
It is also important to recognize that our current levels of inequality are 
themselves the product of government action.199 High levels of inequality are not 
the inexorable consequence of capitalism. The drop in wealth inequality 
beginning in the 1930s and lasting through the late 1970s was the result of policy 
changes that accompanied the New Deal, particularly high marginal tax rates on 
the wealthy and the implementation of an estate tax.200 The return of wealth 
inequality since the 1980s was also the result of government policies, particularly 
the lowering of income tax rates for the highest earners, reductions in the estate 
tax, and financial deregulation.201 Since our current high levels of inequality are 
the result of government action, it makes sense that addressing that inequality 
will also require government action. 
In addition to undermining the general welfare, high levels of inequality 
also represent a direct threat to our democracy.202 Governmental power in a 
democracy comes from the consent of the governed.203 And the ability of the 
198  See Feldman, supra note 7, at 264 n.21 (noting other Founding-era documents that stressed 
that government is supposed to work for the common benefit rather than for the interests of 
particular groups); see also Andrias, supra note 7, at 433–34, 444 n.124 (arguing that the Federalist 
papers show that the Framers were concerned about the possibility of government being used to 
favor a particular faction rather than the general good). 
199  See, e.g., Kevin G. Bender, Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the 
Federal Securities Laws Facilitate Wealth Inequality, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1 (2016) (arguing that 
federal securities laws facilitate growing wealth inequality); Cappiello, supra note 7, at 402 
(arguing that bankruptcy laws in the U.S. were “designed by the credit industry for the credit 
industry” and increase economic inequality); Chung, supra note 7, at 276–77, 293–303 (arguing 
that wealth inequality was exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s decision to engage in quantitative 
easing after the Great Recession); Feldman, supra note 7, at 316–19 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizen’s United greatly increased the influence of wealthy corporate interests 
over government policy in ways that increased inequality). 
200  See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 554. 
201  Id. 
 202  See Feldman, supra note 7, at 332 (“Exorbitant material inequality threatens to crack the 
pillars of democratic culture.”); Solt, Democratic Political Engagement, supra note 45, at 57 
(“That democratic regimes depend for their very existence on a relatively equal distribution of 
economic resources across citizens is one of the oldest and best established insights in the study of 
politics.”); see also Foa & Mounk, supra note 77, at 15 fig.5 (showing that increases in inequality 
are associated with decreases in the electorate’s satisfaction with democracy). 
203  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed . . . .”). 
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governed to affect government policy through the democratic process is a key 
measure of the health of democracies.204 But that linkage no longer works in the 
U.S.205 The wealthy have significant influence over the government and use that 
influence to protect and increase their wealth, even when that is not what the 
majority of Americans want.206 High levels of inequality also undermine popular 
support for democracy and increase the risk that a country will become 
authoritarian.207 In effect, if our current high levels of inequality persist, we run 
a real risk that the U.S. will become authoritarian.208 Thus, our current high level 
of inequality both undermines democratic accountability and increases the risk 
of authoritarianism. It may also raise Constitutional concerns about the 
separation of powers209 and the Due Process clause.210 
In the face of this evidence, many political scientists have come to the 
conclusion that the influence the wealthy have over government policy, 
particularly their ability to prevent the majority from taking actions which are 
widely supported, demonstrates that our democracy is not functioning 
properly.211 Some have gone further and argued that the U.S. is no longer a 
204  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 426 n.26 (“[T]here is general agreement among theorists that 
citizens in a democracy ought have equal opportunity to influence the political process, and that 
government ought to be responsive to their views.”); Gilens, supra note 82, at 778 (“The ability of 
citizens to influence public policy is the ‘bottom line’ of democratic government.”); id. at 779 
(“[T]he connection between what citizens want and what government does is a central 
consideration in evaluating the quality of democratic governance.”). 
205  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 426 (“In particular, wealth’s dominance undermines the 
promise that our system of political checks will produce a government roughly responsive to the 
majority will.”). 
206  See supra Section III.B. 
207  Id. 
 208  See Foa & Mounk, supra note 77, at 17 (noting that “countries in which more than 20 percent 
of respondents express cynicism of democratic governance have, historically, been highly 
susceptible to the rise of authoritarian parties, candidates, and political movements”). 
209  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 486 (arguing that as a result of “wealth’s disproportionate 
influence at every step of the political and governing process . . . the democratic accountability 
promised by inter-branch competition, as well as by alternative mechanisms of political 
competition, is missing”). The separation of powers between the various branches of our 
constitutional system was intended, in part, to ensure democratic accountability and prevent one 
group from dominating all the levers of power. See id. at 485–87. 
210  Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that 
“legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring 
about repeal of undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under 
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are more other types of legislation”). 
Regrettably, the suggestion in Carolene Products that attempts to undermine democratic 
accountability could violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause has never been 
developed by the Supreme Court. 
211  See Gilens, supra note 82, at 794 (“[A] government that is democratic in form but is in 
practice only responsive to its most affluent citizens is a democracy in name only.”); Gilens & 
Page, supra note 82, at 576 (“In the United States, . . . the majority does not rule . . . . When a 
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democracy at all but is now functionally an oligarchy.212 Now is the time for the 
government to strengthen our democracy by reducing inequality. To do nothing 
and permit the U.S. to descend into authoritarianism would be unacceptable.213 
Unfortunately, change does not seem possible through the normal 
lawmaking process. The wealthy have been very successful at preventing the 
government from taking actions that would reduce inequality.214 Moreover, even 
if a law was passed that reduced inequality, that law would immediately face a 
well-funded and well-organized campaign to dilute or eliminate it. For this 
reason, this Article advocates a constitutional Amendment. Constitutional 
amendments are difficult to pass.215 This is, in fact, one of their defining 
features.216 That makes it less likely that any constitutional amendment will be 
adopted. But once adopted, it would also be extremely difficult to remove.217 
This means that it would be much harder for the wealthy to undermine the 
Amendment. 
As President Obama declared in 2013, “[growing inequality] is the 
defining challenge of our time.”218 The level of inequality we are now 
majority of citizens disagrees with economic elites or with organized interests, they generally 
lose.”); see also Andrias, supra note 7, at 471–75 (arguing that the wealthy have been able to 
strategically create governmental gridlock in ways that have benefitted their interests). 
212  See generally Winters & Page, supra note 83. 
 213  For example, the Declaration of Independence argues that governments that fail to ensure 
the “Safety and Happiness” of their citizens can and should be changed, even abolished, if 
necessary. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That whenever any Form of 
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish 
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to [a]ffect their Safety and Happiness.”). 
214  See supra Section III.B. 
 215  See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.”). 
216  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 7. 
 217  The only time a constitutional amendment has been removed is when the 21st Amendment 
repealed the 18th Amendment. The 18th Amendment instituted prohibition. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XVIII (“After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is 
hereby prohibited.”). This was subsequently repealed by the 21st Amendment. See id. amend. XXI 
(“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby 
repealed.”). 
218  Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 4 Remarks on the Economy, supra note 2. 
See also Pickett & Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 316 (noting that various world leaders, including 
the U.S. President, the Pope, and the UN Secretary General have all identified inequality as one of 
the most important problems of our time). 
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experiencing represents an existential threat to our society and democracy and 
something must be done about it.219 Ultimately, if we are to take seriously 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky’s claim that “constitutional law is about the 
meaning of a just society and how best to achieve it,”220 then a constitutional 
amendment that addresses inequality is necessary. 
VI. THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
If a constitutional amendment is the appropriate method for addressing 
inequality, what should that amendment look like? One possibility would be to 
simply eliminate inequality, but that is not what this Article proposes. There are 
a couple of reasons why eliminating all economic inequality is not desirable. We 
have a capitalist economy and that implies a certain level of inequality. Indeed, 
some amount of economic inequality is probably beneficial as the possibility of 
achieving more wealth than others can be a powerful motivator that can drive 
innovations that benefit society as a whole.221 Moreover, while Americans want 
a society with dramatically lower inequality than we have now, they do not want 
a society with perfect wealth equality.222 In addition, trying to simply eliminate 
inequality, particularly abruptly, would probably result in widespread economic 
chaos.223 So this Amendment does not try to eliminate all inequality. 
Nor does the proposed Amendment require the U.S. to reach a particular 
level of inequality. One could imagine an amendment that specified a particular 
219  Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 4 Remarks on the Economy, supra note 2 
(“The combined trends of increased inequality and decreasing mobility pose a fundamental threat 
to the American Dream, our way of life, and what we stand for around the globe.”); id. (“And 
finally, rising inequality and declining mobility are bad for our democracy. Ordinary folks can’t 
write massive campaign checks or hire high-priced lobbyists and lawyers to secure policies that 
tilt the playing field in their favor at everyone else’s expense.”); see also Porter, supra note 4 (“The 
bloated incarceration rates and rock-bottom life expectancy, the unraveling families and the 
stagnant college graduation rates amount to an existential threat to the nation’s future.”). 
220  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1. 
 221  See Bermeo, supra note 44, at 26 (“The idea that differential rewards provide incentives for 
productivity and innovation is intrinsic to capitalism . . . .”); Full Transcript: President Obama’s 
December 4 Remarks on the Economy, supra note 2 (“We admire folks who start new businesses, 
create jobs and invent the products that enrich our lives. And we expect them to be rewarded 
handsomely for it.”). 
222  See Norton & Ariely, supra note 141, at 10 (noting that when Americans were asked to 
construct a society with an ideal amount of wealth inequality, they picked one that was somewhat 
unequal but with dramatically lower levels of wealth inequality than is actually present in the U.S. 
today). 
223  It took nearly 50 years for inequality to retreat from the highs of the late 1920s to the lows 
of the late 1970s. See supra text accompanying notes 199–201. Then, it took another 40 years from 
the 1980s until today for inequality to increase to its current high levels. Id. So, it will presumably 
take a significant amount of time for inequality levels to retreat. Trying to make these changes 
occur very quickly might well result in economic chaos. 
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level of wealth inequality and required the government to achieve it.224 There are 
several problems with such an amendment. The most important problem is that 
we do not know the ideal amount of inequality. We know that lower inequality 
is associated with many benefits,225 but inequality also has some benefits.226 
Unfortunately, we do not know where to draw the right balance between the 
benefits of inequality and its adverse consequences.227 For this reason, the 
Amendment does not try to specify a particular goal for wealth inequality.228 
Rather, it advocates a less radical and more incremental approach to 
addressing inequality. Specifically, it imposes a requirement that the federal 
government evaluate the impact on wealth inequality of every new law or rule. 
And it prohibits the passage of laws that would increase inequality unless the 
government can demonstrate that the law is necessary to achieve an important 
governmental purpose. The text of the proposed Amendment follows: 
Excessive wealth inequality is harmful. The United States must 
assess the impact on wealth inequality of all new legislation and 
rulemaking prior to adoption. The nature of the assessment must 
be proportional to the expected impact of the legislation or rule. 
Such assessments must be public and are subject to judicial 
review. The assessment is entitled to judicial deference if it is 
both scientific and reasonable. A law or rule may not increase 
wealth inequality unless that law or rule is narrowly tailored to 
achieve an important governmental purpose, and the expected 
benefit of achieving that purpose exceeds the cost of increasing 
wealth inequality. Individuals or organizations have standing to 
challenge that law or rule if they will fairly and adequately 
224  The simplest way to implement this might be to require that there be an annual wealth tax 
and that the amount of the wealth tax would increase incrementally until the desired Gini 
coefficient of wealth inequality was achieved. The wealth tax could then be decreased to whatever 
is the minimum level necessary to maintain wealth inequality at or below the target level. 
225  See supra Part III. 
226  See supra text accompanying note 221. 
 227  See Bartlett, supra note 7, at 282 (noting that “current levels of economic inequality are 
unacceptable, but there remains the question of how much inequality is too much”). Indeed, there 
may not be one ideal level of inequality for all societies. The “correct” level of inequality probably 
depends on how many of the costs of inequality a society wishes to endure to achieve the benefits. 
And the correct balance may be different for different societies. Thus, the ideal level of inequality 
for the U.S. might end up being different from the ideal level for other countries. Of course, one 
could ask Americans what their preferred level of inequality would be. Cf. Norton & Ariely, supra 
note 141 (surveying Americans about their preferred inequality levels). But there is no guarantee 
that individuals’ preferences would correspond to the theoretically “ideal” level of inequality. 
228  If, as our understanding of the effects of inequality increase, we are eventually able to 
identify what the “ideal” level of inequality is, then it may make sense to specify that as a concrete 
goal. It is not clear, however, whether that will ever be possible. See supra note 227 (suggesting 
that there may not be a single ideal level of inequality that all societies should pursue). 
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represent the public interest in opposing excessive wealth 
inequality. 
One potential criticism of this approach is that it does not require any 
reduction in wealth inequality. It simply prevents the government from 
increasing inequality further. In theory, it could simply lock in the status quo. 
Yet, the status quo is enormously harmful.229 Thus, the argument would go, we 
should do more than simply prevent additional inequality and take concrete steps 
to reduce existing levels of inequality. 
It is true that, in theory, the amendment could simply lock in the existing 
high level of inequality because it does not explicitly mandate reductions in that 
inequality. In practice, that outcome is extremely unlikely because it would 
require Congress to never pass another law that reduced inequality. Rather than 
viewing the amendment as locking in the status quo, it is better to think of the 
amendment as a one-way ratchet.230 Congress will very rarely be able to pass a 
law that increases inequality.231 It will, however, be able to freely pass laws that 
decrease inequality. 
While not all laws have an effect on inequality, Congress does pass laws 
that reduce inequality, sometimes dramatically. For example, in 1935, the 
passage of the Social Security Act “created a social insurance program designed 
to pay retired workers age 65 or older a continuing income after retirement.”232 
The passage of the Social Security Act Amendments of 1965 had the effect of 
creating Medicare, a “basic program of hospital insurance for persons age 65 and 
older, and a supplementary medical insurance program to aid the elderly in 
paying doctor bills and other health care bills.” 233 More recently, the passage of 
the Affordable Care Act led to “historic gains in health insurance coverage by 
extending Medicaid coverage to many low-income individuals” who had not 
previously been able to afford health insurance.234 Thus, after the amendment is 
adopted, more and more laws will be passed that reduce inequality, often by 
small amounts, occasionally by large amounts, but very few or no laws will be 
passed that increase inequality. In effect, the amendment makes it very likely that 
229  See supra Part IV (describing the adverse effects of inequality in the United States today). 
 230  Cf. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Ratchet Effect, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1702, 1704–
05 (2017) (describing how there may be a “ratchet effect” whereby over time more and more of 
our law is transformed into constitutional law). 
231  The Amendment does contemplate some circumstances under which it might be possible to 
increase wealth inequality, but those will probably be extremely rare. See infra Section VI.F. 
(describing the heightened scrutiny that will be applied to laws or rules that increase inequality). 
232  Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
233  Social Security Act Amendments (1965), OUR DOCUMENTS, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=99 (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
234  Key Facts about the Uninsured Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 7, 
2018), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population/. 
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inequality will be reduced incrementally over time. This gradual reduction in 
inequality over time is, in fact, the desired outcome.235 
The components of the proposed amendment and what they mean are 
discussed in the sections below. Each section addresses one of the sentences in 
the amendment. 
A. “Excessive wealth inequality is harmful.”
The first sentence states the conclusion that justifies amending the 
Constitution. In some ways, it may appear unnecessary or contradictory to the 
general practice with regards to constitutional amendments to include this 
sentence. After all, the Thirteenth Amendment does not explicitly state that 
slavery is bad. It simply bans slavery.236 Nevertheless, it seems desirable to 
explicitly state that excessive wealth inequality is harmful for several reasons. 
First, it is important to embed this concept as firmly as possible in the 
Constitution. One thing that has been noticeable is that as inequality grows, those 
with wealth become more successful at capturing the organs of the government 
and using them to protect and expand their wealth.237 Those with the most wealth 
are likely to see this Amendment as an impediment to their goals and attack it. 
And they will have the wealth and incentive to make a concerted and 
well-financed effort to undermine it over a long period of time. By embedding 
the idea that excessive wealth inequality is harmful directly in the Constitution, 
this Amendment establishes it as a fundamental tenet of our constitutional system 
on a par with the importance of due process or the prohibition of slavery. This 
235  See supra note 223 (noting that it took 40 years for inequality levels to rise to their current 
levels and that trying to reverse that process very quickly would probably result in serious 
economic disruption). 
236  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). On the other hand, it is not unusual for 
statutes to contain statements of their purpose. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 2019) (“The 
purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; 
to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; 
and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.”). 
237  See The Editorial Board, The Tax Bill that Inequality Created, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/16/opinion/sunday/tax-bill-inequality-created.html (“As a 
smaller and smaller group of people cornered an ever-larger share of the nation’s wealth, so too 
did they gain an ever-larger share of political power. They became, in effect, kingmakers; the 
[2017] tax bill is a natural consequence of their long effort to bend American politics to serve their 
interests.”); see also supra Section III.B; cf. Solt, Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis, supra 
note 46, at 286–87 (noting that “[h]igher levels of economic inequality allow richer citizens to 
more successfully dominate the setting of the political agenda, pushing beyond debate those issues 
addressing the needs of poorer citizens”). 
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makes it much harder for those who will seek to undermine this Amendment to 
blunt its impact. 
When courts eventually adjudicate disputes about the constitutionality 
of particular laws or rules, they will have to do so in light of the clear statement 
in the Constitution that excessive wealth inequality is harmful. Whatever 
interpretation is given to the Amendment by future courts, it must begin with and 
accept that excessive wealth inequality is harmful.238 This will limit attempts to 
blunt the impact of the Amendment by creative legal arguments that question or 
downplay the harm caused by excessive inequality. 
Second, the introductory sentence is important because it makes it clear 
that it is excessive wealth inequality that is harmful, not wealth inequality itself. 
Ours is a capitalist society, and some level of inequality is unavoidable and 
probably even desirable.239 So this Amendment does not try to eliminate all 
inequality. But the evidence is overwhelming that excessive wealth inequality is 
harmful.240 In this sense, the word “excessive” may well be the most important 
word in the entire Amendment.241 
Finally, this sentence makes it clear that the Amendment focuses 
specifically on wealth inequality, rather than income inequality or economic 
inequality. Wealth inequality was chosen over income inequality for a number 
of reasons.242 Arguably, the most important reason is that wealth inequality is 
greater than income inequality.243 As a result, a focus on wealth inequality better 
captures the true level of inequality in the U.S.244 
Wealth inequality was also chosen over economic inequality, although 
for different reasons. At first glance, economic inequality appears to be a better 
focus for the Amendment. Economic inequality is a broader term that includes 
wealth inequality but also access to other economic opportunities.245 Thus, in 
theory, economic inequality captures the true state of inequality in American 
better than wealth inequality.246 But economic inequality is a much broader and 
more ambiguous concept. This is problematic because the Amendment depends 
on the ability of the government and litigants to measure both the current state 
238  This may help alleviate Professor Andrias’s concern that judges are not the best group to 
scrutinize the effects of inequality because they are generally elites who may be predisposed to 
favor the interests of the wealthy. See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492. 
239  See supra text accompanying notes 221–222. 
240  See supra Part III. 
 241  The Amendment deliberately does not take a position on what level of wealth inequality is 
appropriate or desirable. See supra text accompanying notes 224–228. 
242  See supra text accompanying notes 36–40. 
243  See supra text accompanying notes 36–40. 
244  See supra text accompanying notes 36–40. 
245  See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
246  See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
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of inequality and the effect of legislation on it. This would be very hard to do 
with economic inequality,247 but would be much easier with wealth inequality. 
First, most of the information necessary to measure wealth inequality either 
already exists or would not be hard to obtain.248 Second, while it would be very 
difficult to predict the impact of legislation and rulemaking on all forms of 
economic inequality, it is feasible to estimate the impact on wealth inequality.249 
Thus, wealth inequality does a pretty good job of capturing what makes America 
unequal, without causing the measurement and prediction problems that would 
stem from using economic inequality in the Amendment. 
B. “The United States must assess the impact of all new legislation and
rulemaking on wealth inequality prior to adoption.”
This sentence addresses a number of issues. First, it defines which parts 
of our government are bound by the Amendment. The Amendment applies to the 
“United States,” i.e., the federal government. It does not affect private action, it 
does not bind local governments and it does not bind the states. It only affects 
the federal government. This is roughly equivalent to the existing “state action” 
doctrine in constitutional law.250 Of course, the federal government is the largest 
government in the country, so the effect will be far from negligible. 
One might question why the Amendment does not apply to state and 
local governments. After all, if preventing the federal government from 
increasing inequality is desirable, wouldn’t it also be desirable to do the same 
with state and local governments? The main reason to limit the Amendment to 
the federal government is because the federal government is the principal cause 
of the surge in inequality that has occurred since the 1980s. That surge was driven 
largely by decreases in the income tax, reductions in the estate tax, and the 
deregulation of industry.251 Those changes were all implemented at the federal 
level. Thus, while it is almost certainly true that state and local governments have 
some impact on inequality, the principal driver of inequality is the federal 
government. For that reason, this Amendment applies only to the federal 
government.252 
Second, it makes clear that the Amendment applies to only new 
legislation and rulemaking. It does not impose a requirement that the federal 
247  See supra text accompanying notes 42–44. 
 248  See infra text accompanying notes 257–261 (noting that the government already collects 
most of the information it needs to estimate the amount of wealth inequality in the United States). 
249  See infra text accompanying notes 262–265 (noting that some private groups already 
estimate the effect of major legislation on inequality). 
250  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 507–09. 
251  See supra text accompanying notes 199–201. 
 252  Of course, nothing prevents states from implementing similar provisions in their own state 
constitutions. 
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government review all existing laws and rules for their effect on inequality. This 
was done for pragmatic reasons. A strong moral argument could be made that we 
should consider the consequences of the laws that formed the society we 
currently have. They clearly permit significant and damaging inequality.253 But 
requiring us to quickly and completely re-imagine society (which a retrospective 
test for all existing law would necessitate), would require dramatic and 
wrenching changes. This Amendment makes a choice to accept all of the 
decisions that have already been made and focus on improving the future. Thus, 
the changes that will occur will be incremental and less disruptive to society and 
the economy.254 
Third, the Amendment applies to laws passed by Congress and to 
rulemaking by federal agencies. While it has a broad reach, it does not cover all 
government action. For example, it does not cover much of the day to day 
operations of the federal government. Individual decisions taken pursuant to laws 
and rules are not subject to scrutiny. It is assumed that if the laws and rules 
comply with the Amendment, then the day to day application of those laws will 
also comply.255 
While it might be possible to impose an obligation to assess the impact 
of every government action on wealth inequality, that does not seem prudent. 
After all, the government must still be able to function after the Amendment is 
added to the Constitution. If the government were required to evaluate the effect 
on inequality of every single act, it would make it hard for the government to get 
anything done. Most governmental acts, however, are presumably taken pursuant 
to either laws or rules. Thus, requiring the government to assess the effect of new 
laws and rules in advance should help ensure that the acts taken to effectuate 
those laws do not undermine the purpose of the Amendment. 
Fourth, and most importantly, the Amendment requires the federal 
government to assess the impact on wealth inequality of all new laws and rules. 
This assessment must be undertaken prior to the law or rule being adopted. This 
253  See supra Part IV. 
 254  It has taken nearly 40 years for wealth inequality to reach its current levels from the lows of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. See supra Part IV. It is unlikely that this process can be reversed 
very quickly. For this reason, an incremental approach is probably best. 
255  This will not always true. There are lots of examples of governments applying facially 
neutral laws and rules in ways which have turned out to be discriminatory or harmful. See, e.g., 
Rebecca Onion, Take the Impossible “Literacy” Test Louisiana Gave Black Voters in the 1960s, 
SLATE (June 28, 2013), https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/06/voting-rights-and-the-supreme-
court-the-impossible-literacy-test-louisiana-used-to-give-black-voters.html (describing how 
facially neutral literacy tests were used to disenfranchise African-Americans during the 1960s). 
Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to assume that most of the time, if a good faith effort is made 
to apply rules or laws that comply with this Amendment, then the effects on inequality will not be 
too great. 
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means that every rule or law, before it can be adopted, will have to be 
accompanied by a public256 assessment of the effect of the rule on inequality. 
For this assessment to be possible it first requires a way to measure 
wealth inequality. Fortunately, the calculation of wealth inequality is possible,257 
although not necessarily easy.258 Still, if two researchers can do it on their own,259 
then the government (with all of the resources it could bring to bear) can certainly 
do it too.260 In many cases, the data needed to calculate wealth inequality are 
already collected by financial institutions for use in managing their clients’ 
accounts, and the additional cost of requiring those to be reported to the 
government would be relatively low.261 
Next, it requires the ability to predict the effect of legislation and 
rulemaking on wealth inequality. While the government does not currently do 
that, there does not seem to be any reason why it could not. After all, the 
government already assesses the economic impact of major legislation. For 
example, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) conducted an in-depth 
assessment of the economic impact of the 2017 Tax Act.262 However, despite 
predicting the impact of the 2017 Tax Act on GDP, corporate income tax rates, 
and investment,263 it never mentions its effect on inequality.264 But, a number of 
private groups already use sophisticated models to predict the economic effect 
of major legislation, including the impact on inequality.265 In other words, the 
256  See infra Section VI.D (discussing the requirement that the assessments be public). 
 257  See Saez & Zucman, supra note 30, at 520 (describing a way to calculate wealth inequality 
from data collected for the payment of income taxes). 
258  Id. at 527–40 (describing the complex process by which Saez and Zucman calculated wealth 
inequality in the United States). 
259  See generally id. 
 260  Saez and Zucman note that the U.S. government could produce much better estimates of 
wealth inequality than they were able to simply by using data that the IRS already has and 
combining those with data that the Treasury Department could collect “at low cost.” Id. at 525; see 
also id. at 574 (“The ideal source for studying wealth inequality would be high-quality annual 
wealth data collected by governments . . . .”). 
261  Id. at 574–75. 
 262  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 TO 2028, at 105 
app.B (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-04/53651-outlook-2.pdf. 
263  Id. at 106. 
 264  This was confirmed by text searching the CBO report for the terms “economic inequality,” 
“wealth inequality,” and “inequality.” None of those terms was found anywhere in the report. 
265  For example, the Penn Wharton Budget Model can be used to predict the “distribution of 
income over time” of new policies. Our Model, PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL, 
http://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/our-model-0 (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). The Tax Policy 
Center has a “Microsimulation Model” that it has used to produce estimates of the effects of major 
legislation, like the 2017 Tax Act. Donald Trump’s Revised Tax Plan, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 11, 
2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/model-estimates/donald-trumps-revised-tax-plan-oct-
2016/t16-0211-donald-trumps-revised-tax-plan. 
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government could have estimated the effect of the 2017 Tax Act on inequality if 
it had wanted to.266 
Perhaps more importantly, requiring the government to estimate the 
effect of legislation and rulemaking on inequality will force the government to 
think carefully about the impact of its actions. For example, the 2017 Tax Act 
“lowers . . . the tax rate paid by businesses subject to corporate income tax,”267 
reduces the marginal tax rate paid by the highest earners,268 and reduces the 
taxation of wealth transferred at death.269 These changes seem likely to increase 
economic inequality by reducing the taxes (and therefore increasing the income) 
of the wealthiest people.270 The 2017 Tax Act might have been harder to pass if 
the government had been forced to publicly acknowledge this prior to it 
becoming law. 
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that making the effects of 
legislation on wealth inequality public might itself reduce inequality over time. 
One group of scholars has argued that the lack of demand for redistributive 
policies is partly due to a lack of information about how unequal societies have 
become.271 This suggests that if the true state of inequality or the effect of 
legislation on inequality were better known, this would increase demands for 
more fair policies.272 Ultimately, increasing public awareness about inequality 
could itself contribute to decreasing it. 
266  Indeed, the Tax Policy Center did estimate the distributional effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act in real time. Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/feature/analysis-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act (last updated May 3, 
2019). If a think tank can do it, the U.S. government can do it too. 
267  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 262, at 107. 
268  Id. at 112. 
269  Id. at 113 (discussing the effect of changes to the estate and gift taxes). 
 270  Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 266, at fig.1 (finding that the Act would 
provide the greatest benefit to Americans in the top 5% of the income distribution); Dylan Scott & 
Alvin Chang, The Republican Tax Bill Will Exacerbate Income Inequality in America, VOX (Dec. 
4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/2/16720952/senate-tax-bill-
inequality (noting that the reduction in the corporate tax rate “is expected to disproportionately 
benefit the wealthy” and that “rolling back the estate tax” is an “unambiguous giveaway[] to the 
richest Americans”); The Editorial Board, supra note 237. 
271  See generally Vladimir Gimpelson & Daniel Treisman, Misperceiving Inequality, 30 ECON. 
& POL. 27 (2018). 
272  Id.; see also Leslie McCall et al., Exposure to Rising Inequality Shapes Americans’ 
Opportunity Beliefs and Policy Support, 114 PNAS 9593 (2017) (finding that people exposed to 
information about the true level of inequality in the United States became more willing to support 
policies aimed at reducing inequality). 
38 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 
C. “The nature of the assessment must be proportional to the expected
impact of the legislation or rule.”
This sentence recognizes that evaluating the impact of laws and rules 
will not be a one-size-fits-all undertaking. Rather, the nature of the assessment is 
a function of the expected impact of the rule or law being considered. If a rule is 
expected to have a relatively small impact on inequality, then it makes sense that 
the government’s assessment of its impact could be simpler than it would be if 
the rule were expected to have a large impact. 
So, for example, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has 
promulgated rules that govern the maximum levels of natural or unavoidable 
defects that present no health hazard that are permitted in foods for human use.273 
It seems unlikely that there is great potential for affecting wealth inequality in 
rules that govern the maximum permitted amount of insect parts in ground 
allspice.274 Such a rule would probably be accompanied by a very simple 
assessment. 
On the other hand, a law that has a larger expected impact would require 
a more sophisticated analysis. For example, a law like the 2017 Tax Act that 
significantly changes the tax code could be expected to have a significant impact 
on wealth inequality and would require a sophisticated assessment of its effect.275 
Of course, the federal government already creates sophisticated assessments of 
the economic impact of major legislation like the 2017 Tax Act.276 So, extending 
that analysis to estimate the effect on wealth inequality would not impose an 
insurmountable new burden on the federal government.277 
D. “Such assessments must be public and are subject to judicial review.”
It is important that the government’s assessments (and the reasoning and 
data that supports those assessments) be public.278 This will permit citizens to 
evaluate the actions of their government. After all, if the government consistently 
273  Natural or Unavoidable Defects in Food for Human Use that Present No Health Hazard, 21 
C.F.R. § 110.110 (2019).
274  See Food Defect Levels Handbook, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/guidancedocumentsregulatoryinformation/sanitatio
ntransportation/ucm056174.htm. 
275  See supra text accompanying notes 262–270 (assessing the economic effects of the 2017 
Tax Act). 
276  See supra text accompanying notes 262–264 (describing the government’s analysis of the 
2017 Tax Act). 
277  See supra text accompanying note 265 (arguing that predicting the effect of legislation on 
wealth inequality is not an insurmountable problem). 
278  Cf. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
(noting that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” and arguing that more public 
disclosure would help people better restrain the damaging effects of wealth concentration). 
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passes laws that its own assessments predict will increase inequality, it is 
important that citizens know this so that they can decide whether their 
representatives are really representing their interests.279 Making the 
government’s assessment public (including the reasoning and data that support 
the assessment) will also make it easier for people to decide whether to challenge 
the government’s assessment. If the assessment contains questionable 
assumptions or data, that will make it more likely that the assessment will be 
challenged. 
Public disclosure may also help keep the government honest as it will 
have to show how it arrived at its assessment. There will be incentives for 
governments to produce assessments that minimize the impact of policies the 
government wishes to engage in. For example, the Council of Economic 
Advisors’ estimate of the effect of the 2017 Tax Act, which predicted that 
reducing corporate tax rates would dramatically increase economic growth and 
offset the loss of revenue caused by the tax cut, was viewed as deeply flawed and 
self-serving by many experts.280 In another example, the Trump Administration 
is changing the way it calculates the effect of climate change to simply eliminate 
consideration of harms that occur after 2040 as a means to justify rolling back 
environmental regulations designed to mitigate those future harms.281 This has 
been described by scientists as “a pretty blatant attempt to politicize the 
science—to push the science in a direction that’s consistent with their 
politics.”282 Making the reasoning and assumptions of all assessments public will 
make it harder (although not impossible) for governments to “massage” the 
numbers to achieve a preferred outcome. 
279  Since increasing economic inequality places a greater and greater share of the resources into 
fewer and fewer hands, most people do not want a society characterized by excessive wealth 
inequality and they do not want their representatives in the federal government to deliberately 
increase wealth inequality unless there are powerful reasons to justify it. See supra Section III.B 
(describing the attitudes of the middle class and the poor towards wealth inequality); see also 
Norton & Ariely, supra note 141, at 10 (noting that when Americans were asked to construct a 
society with an ideal amount of wealth inequality, they picked one that was somewhat unequal but 
with dramatically lower levels of wealth inequality than is actually present in the U.S. today). 
Indeed, there is some evidence that making more information about the effects of legislation on 
inequality might increase demands for redistributive policies. See Gimpelson & Treisman, supra 
note 271. 
280  See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Everybody Hates the Trump Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/opinion/trump-tax-plan-hate.html. 
281  See Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate 
Science, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-
climate-science.html. 
282  Id. (quoting Philip P. Duffy, president of the Woods Hold Research Center and one of the 
scientists that reviewed the government’s last National Climate Assessment). 
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This portion of the proposed amendment also makes it clear that the 
government’s assessments can be challenged in court.283 The government’s 
assessments are not sacrosanct. The courts will have an important role to play in 
ensuring that the government complies with the Amendment. This oversight by 
the courts will limit the government’s ability to adopt flawed or self-serving 
assessments that are designed to minimize or hide expected increases in wealth 
inequality caused by proposed legislation or rulemaking.284 The federal 
government must make a reasonable and scientific assessment,285 and, if it does 
not, it risks having that assessment overturned by the courts and the resulting 
legislation held to be unconstitutional. 
The availability of judicial review implicitly raises the question of 
severability. If the law is a single integrated whole that unconstitutionally 
increases inequality, then the entire act must be struck down.286 For example, a 
law that contained a single provision that eliminated the estate tax would almost 
certainly violate this amendment because it would increase inequality but not 
serve any important governmental purpose.287 Moreover, it would be difficult to 
imagine how such a law could be saved by severing part of it.288 Removing the 
unconstitutional part (the elimination of the estate tax) would leave nothing 
behind. In effect, the entire law would have to be struck down. 
But, what if we consider a law that includes provisions that both increase 
and decrease inequality? The recent 2017 Tax Act is an example of this, as it 
contained some tax reductions for the poor and middle class that (on their own) 
would have slightly reduced inequality,289 but it also contained provisions that 
increased inequality by reducing taxes for the wealthy.290 Could the courts strike 
down just those portions that increase inequality thus bringing the act into 
283  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing that U.S. courts can review laws 
and find them unconstitutional). 
284  See supra notes 280–282 (describing some recent attempts by the federal government to 
produce flawed assessments designed to justify a particular policy). 
285  See infra Section VI.E. 
 286  See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (noting that a statute that is not 
“fully operative as a law” after the unconstitutional part is removed must be struck down in its 
entirety). 
287  It is hard to imagine what important governmental purpose would be served by permitting 
the extremely wealthy to transmit all of their wealth to their offspring. 
288  Cf. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (stating that the Court’s goal is to “refrain from 
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary” (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 
(1984))). 
289  The Tax Policy Center’s analysis indicated that the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act would 
slightly increase the after-tax income of people in the bottom three quintiles, although the average 
gain would be less than 1%, even as the Act provided the largest benefits for individuals in the top 
5% of the income distribution. See Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 266. 
290  See supra text accompanying notes 262–270 (describing the 2017 Tax Act and its effect on 
wealth inequality). 
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compliance with the amendment? Or, is it necessary to strike down the entire act 
and require Congress to start over? 
This is a difficult issue.291 While there is a general rule in favor of saving 
as much of the statute or rule as possible,292 there are practical difficulties in 
implementing this rule. After all, if the judiciary decides which parts of the law 
to keep and which parts to invalidate, the court might end up effectively rewriting 
the law in ways that are not consistent with Congress’s original intent.293 Thus, 
the general practice is for the court to sever portions of a law only if Congress 
would have enacted the law even if it did not contain the unconstitutional 
provision.294 
This imposes a difficult counterfactual on the court and it may not be 
easy to determine whether Congress (or an agency) would have passed the law 
or rule if it did not have the contested provision.295 These difficult questions 
could be made easier if Congress and the various federal agencies routinely 
included severability clauses in laws and rules.296 Severability clauses could give 
the courts guidance about which parts could be severed. But, ultimately, the 
courts will have to decide whether it makes sense to sever the parts of the statute 
that make it unconstitutional or whether to strike down the entire thing.297 It is 
assumed that they will use the existing “well established” severability rules when 
making those decisions.298 
291  See Abbe R. Gluck & Michael J. Graetz, Opinion, The Severability Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2012 (discussing the difficult choices presented by severing the unconstitutional parts of 
a statute). 
292  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684. 
 293  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Judiciary, if it orders uncritical severance, then assumes the legislative function; for it imposes on 
the Nation, by the Court’s own decree, its own statutory regime . . . .”). 
294  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684. 
295  See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE
L.J. 2286, 2295 (2015).
296  See id. at 2313–17 (describing the rise of severability clauses in statutes and agency rules). 
 297  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684. An alternative approach, although not one necessarily 
endorsed by this Article, would be to have the courts sever the unconstitutional parts of the statute 
and simultaneously temporarily enjoin that decision. This would give Congress time to rewrite the 
statute to save the parts that are important while also complying with the Constitution. See 
generally Robert L. Nightingale, How to Trim a Christmas Tree: Beyond Severability and 
Inseverability for Omnibus Statutes, 125 YALE L.J. 1672 (2016). 
298  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684 (describing the severability rules discussed in Alaska 
Airlines as “well established”). 
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E. “The assessment is entitled to judicial deference if it is both scientific
and reasonable.”
While it is important that the government’s assessments be subject to 
judicial review, that does not mean that the courts should review all of the 
government’s decision-making de novo.299 Rather, the government will often be 
entitled to judicial deference with regards to its assessments. That judicial 
deference is not automatic, however. The courts should not give deference in 
situations where the government is not acting in good faith to assess the impact 
on inequality.300 Rather than have the courts assess the government’s good faith 
directly, however, the Amendment creates a safe harbor provision. 
So long as the assessment is both scientific301 and reasonable,302 the 
assessment will be entitled to judicial deference. To be scientific, an assessment 
would have to be “grounded in the methods and procedures of science.”303 It 
must be more than simply “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”304 
Rather, it must be “derived from the scientific method.”305 To be reasonable, an 
assessment must be a “reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing 
interests.”306 In effect, the government must be making an honest and 
evidence-based effort to understand a complex problem. It cannot simply be 
producing a biased assessment to support a predetermined outcome.307 When the 
government undertakes a reasonable and scientific assessment, then courts 
should defer to that assessment. If the government’s assessment does not meet 
these criteria, then the court is free to ignore it when determining whether the 
law or rule complies with this Amendment. 
Of course, deference to the government’s determinations is not intended 
to be unlimited. Even if the government’s assessment is entitled to deference, the 
299  De novo review means the court would consider the effect of the legislation or rulemaking 
on inequality anew, as if no governmental assessment had been done. Cf. Freeman v. DirecTV, 
Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006). 
300  See supra notes 280–282 (describing some recent attempts by the federal government to 
produce flawed assessments designed to justify a particular policy). 
301  Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing the requirement 
that expert testimony be scientific in nature to be admissible). 
302  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that the 
courts must defer to an agency’s administrative actions if they are reasonable). 
303  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
304  Id. 
305  Id. 
306  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). 
 307  See supra notes 280–282 (describing some recent attempts by the federal government to 
produce flawed assessments designed to justify a particular policy). 
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courts may still ignore it if it is clearly erroneous.308 An assessment will be clearly 
erroneous, and thus not subject to deference, if the court is “left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”309 
F. “A law or rule may not increase wealth inequality unless that law or rule
is narrowly tailored to achieve an important governmental purpose, and
the expected benefit of achieving that purpose exceeds the cost of
increasing wealth inequality.”
This represents the heart of the Amendment. First, if a law or rule does 
not result in a net increase in wealth inequality, then the law or rule may be 
adopted. There is no requirement that laws must reduce inequality.310 
However, if a law or rule would result in a net increase in wealth 
inequality, then there are additional requirements that must be met before it can 
be adopted. The Amendment does not prohibit all laws or rules that increase 
inequality. Rather, it subjects them to heightened scrutiny. First, the rule must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve an important governmental purpose. This language 
is similar in nature to the existing “intermediate scrutiny” standard in 
constitutional law.311 It requires that the purpose of the law must be an 
“important” one rather than simply a legitimate goal of government.312 In 
addition, the law must be substantially related to achieving that important 
governmental purpose, rather than simply a reasonable way of doing so.313 As a 
result, the way in which the law or rule operates must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve an important governmental goal.314 
In addition to satisfying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the expected 
benefit of the law must exceed the cost of the net increase in wealth inequality. 
308  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (noting that judicial determinations of fact should not be set 
aside on appeal unless they are “clearly erroneous”). 
309  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 235 (2001) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
310  Having said that, there is an expectation that severely limiting the government’s ability to 
pass laws that increase inequality will result in inequality gradually decreasing. See supra text 
accompanying notes 229–235. 
311  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 540. 
 312  Id.; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional 
challenge, previous cases established that classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives . . . .”). 
313  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 540; see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (“To withstand 
constitutional challenge, previous cases established that classifications by gender . . . must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
314 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 541; see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 
556 (2001) (refusing to apply the “least restrictive means” test to restrictions on commercial speech 
but holding that they must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve the desired outcome (citations 
omitted)). 
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Implicitly, this means that if the government’s assessment finds that the law or 
rule will increase inequality and the government wishes to pass the law anyway, 
it must also quantify the expected benefit of the law and show that the expected 
benefit exceeds the cost of the net increase in wealth inequality. The achievement 
of the expected benefit identified in the assessment must also be an important 
governmental purpose. 
The effect of this is to limit the government’s ability to pass laws or rules 
that increase wealth inequality without a very good reason. It is not a blanket ban 
on laws or rules that increase economic inequality. There may be some important 
governmental purpose that can only be achieved by increasing inequality. If that 
is the case, then this Amendment does permit laws that will increase inequality. 
But it has the effect of requiring the government to assess the impact on wealth 
inequality before passing new laws or rules and it forces the government to 
justify any laws or rules that will increase inequality. Given this restriction, it is 
expected that the government will only rarely be able to justify increasing 
inequality. 
Professor Andrias has previously considered whether heightened 
judicial scrutiny of legislation that benefits the wealthy is a good idea.315 She 
ultimately concluded that heightened judicial review would not be the best 
course.316 The Amendment proposed in this Article, however, avoids many of 
her criticisms. Her first criticism is that courts are not well placed to evaluate the 
impact of legislation on inequality.317 This concern is mitigated by the fact that 
the court will not be conducting its own assessment of the effect of the challenged 
legislation or rule, rather it will be evaluating the government’s assessment of 
that effect. This transfers the initial burden of assessing the impact of legislation 
to the government, which has the expertise and resources to undertake it. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs in these actions are likely to have the expertise and 
resources to produce their own models of the effect of legislation on 
inequality.318 Thus, courts will not have to produce their own estimates of the 
effects of legislation, but rather evaluate the models produced by the parties. 
Trial judges are not scientists, but they do engage in something similar to this 
315  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 488–89 (suggesting that one possible response to the influence 
of the wealthy is for courts to impose “greater scrutiny” when “governmental action serves to 
further concentrate power among the wealthy”). 
316  See id. at 491–92 (arguing that “there are reasons to be wary of relying on the judiciary to 
reduce” the influence of the wealthy on government). 
317  Id. at 491. 
 318  See supra text accompanying notes 265–266 (noting that several organizations already 
operate sophisticated economic models that can produce real time predictions of the effects of 
major legislation); see also infra Section VI.G (requiring that plaintiffs be able to adequately 
represent the public interest, including having the requisite experience and resources to litigate the 
matter). 
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quite regularly—evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony.319 Thus, it 
seems reasonable to assume they can undertake the evaluation required by this 
Amendment.320 
Next, Professor Andrias argues that individuals and organizations with 
concerns about the future implications of legislation will not be able to 
participate because they won’t have standing.321 That is a valid concern under 
the current standing doctrine, which the proposed Amendment resolves by 
creating a special standing provision for suits brought under this Amendment.322 
This will permit individuals and organizations to sue if they can demonstrate that 
they will adequately represent the public interest in opposing excessive wealth 
inequality.323 
She also raises concerns about whether those who are not wealthy will 
be able to compete with wealthy interest groups who can engage in repeated and 
well-financed litigation.324 This is obviously a concern,325 but not one that should 
prevent the adoption of the Amendment. The wealthy will always be at an 
advantage in influencing all of the branches of government by virtue of their 
greater resources.326 If we were to accept that argument as a reason not to try to 
address inequality, then we would never be able to do anything about it. The 
better question is not whether the wealthy influence the courts but rather whether 
the wealthy are significantly better at influencing the courts than they are at 
influencing the other branches. In the absence of such evidence,327 it seems 
appropriate to assign the task of ensuring the constitutionality of the laws to the 
judiciary. That is, after all, one of their traditional functions.328 
319  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (observing that a trial 
judge faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony must make an initial determination of 
whether that testimony is both scientific in nature and will assist the trier of fact (citing FED. R. 
EVID. 702)). 
320  The Supreme Court said of the evaluation of expert testimony that “[w]e are confident that 
federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this review.” Id. at 593. 
321  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 491. 
322  See infra Section VI.G. 
323  Id. 
324  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492. 
 325  See supra text accompanying note 237 (arguing that one reason to frame this as an 
Amendment to the Constitution rather than a statute is to try to insulate if from the efforts of 
wealthy interest groups to undermine it). 
326  See supra Section III.B. 
 327  Professor Andrias’s own work suggests that the wealthy are in fact quite adept at influencing 
all of the branches of the government, especially Congress and the President. See Andrias, supra 
note 7, at 444–52. 
328  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing that U.S. courts can review laws 
and find them unconstitutional). 
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Finally, Professor Andrias expresses concern that judges may not be 
well-placed to adjudicate disputes about economic inequality because they are 
themselves largely elites.329 This is true,330 but so too are most members of 
Congress and the President.331 So, it is not clear that trusting this task to the 
judiciary necessarily involves worse concerns than would trusting it to other 
branches. Moreover, as Professor Andrias acknowledges, Article III judges are 
not subject to capture in quite the same way as the other branches.332 Ultimately, 
the Amendment tries to blunt this impact by expressly embedding in the 
Constitution the idea that excessive wealth inequality is harmful.333 For these 
reasons, the Amendment includes heightened scrutiny of statutes and rules that 
impact wealth inequality despite Professor Andrias’s misgivings. 
G. “Individuals or organizations have standing to challenge that law or
rule if they will fairly and adequately represent the public interest in
opposing excessive wealth inequality.”
The constitutionality of new laws or rules can be challenged under this 
amendment. This is evident from the provision on judicial review.334 But in 
recent decades, the federal courts have erected a number of potential barriers to 
the enforcement of this Amendment. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction would 
not be a problem as federal courts would have jurisdiction over claims made 
under this Amendment.335 But there are other potential problems. For example, 
the Supreme Court has been hostile to private actions to enforce federal law.336 
The Amendment makes it clear that both individuals and organizations have a 
329  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492. 
 330  See Richard Wolf, Nearly All Supreme Court Justices Are Millionaires, USA TODAY (June 
20, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/20/supreme-court-justices-
financial-disclosure/11105985/ (finding that eight of the nine Supreme Court justices in 2014 were 
millionaires, with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg being worth between $5 and $20 million each). 
331  See David Hawkings, Wealth of Congress: Richer Than Ever, But Mostly at the Very Top, 
ROLL CALL (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.rollcall.com/news/hawkings/congress-richer-ever-
mostly-top (finding that the wealth of the median member of Congress was more than five times 
higher than the wealth of the median American). 
332  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 492. 
333  See supra Section VI.A. 
334  See supra Section VI.D. 
 335  Federal district courts would have subject matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to the 
Amendment under the federal question doctrine since the claim would “aris[e] under” the 
Constitution. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2019) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
336  See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of 
Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113 (2010) (describing how the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to permit private plaintiffs to bring suits to enforce federal laws unless the statute clearly 
creates a private right of action). 
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right to challenge laws or rules that are alleged to violate this Amendment. In 
effect, it creates an explicit private right of action to enforce the Amendment. 
This ought to overcome any doubts about whether a private action is permitted.337 
But, a bigger problem is the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence. 
Current standing rules would likely pose an obstacle to enforcement of this 
Amendment.338 So this provision creates a new standing rule for those who wish 
to challenge a law that they believe does not comply with this Amendment. 
“Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper 
party to bring a matter to court for adjudication.”339 Under current standing rules, 
a person has standing to challenge a statute only if they “have been or will 
imminently be” injured by that statute.340 Thus, a person may not challenge a law 
or rule simply because they are opposed to it.341 The Supreme Court has also 
stated that the standing inquiry is “especially rigorous” when the case involves a 
question of whether an act by another branch of the federal government is 
constitutional.342 The Court’s standing doctrine, however, has been widely 
criticized as incoherent and flawed.343 
The current approach to standing, with its focus on a showing of concrete 
harm to a particular plaintiff, presents a problem when dealing with “public” 
issues such as wealth inequality.344 Who will have standing to challenge a law 
337  See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279–80 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1981)) (noting that a private right of action will 
exist when the text of the statute unambiguously confers the right to sue on individuals). 
338  See infra text accompanying notes 344–348. 
339  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 60. 
 340  Id. at 53; see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (explaining that 
standing doctrine requires that the plaintiff suffer an “injury in fact” that is “actual or imminent” 
(citations omitted)). 
341  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–65 (finding that the plaintiff’s intention to visit a site that might be 
adversely affected by an agency decision at some indeterminate point in the future failed to satisfy 
the requirement of an actual or imminent injury). 
342  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997). 
 343  See e.g., Elise C. Boddie, The Sins of Innocence in Standing Doctrine, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
297, 300 (2015) (“Scholars have long criticized the incoherence of standing doctrine . . . .”); Daniel 
E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of
the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 591 (2010) (observing that “standing
doctrine is one of the most widely . . . criticized doctrines in U.S. law”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2002) (“Injury
determinations have been marked by a breathtaking inconsistency.”). Professor Nichol’s article
contains a particularly exhaustive list of the literature that is critical of the standing doctrine.
Nichol, Jr., supra, at 302 n.4.
344  See Andrias, supra note 7, at 491 (arguing that implementing heightened judicial scrutiny 
of laws that increase the concentration of wealth would be difficult, in part because “[i]ndividuals 
or organizations interested in the future implications of a case, but not in the judgment itself, 
generally lack standing and receive inadequate consideration”); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea 
of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 279–80 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on the 
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that increases inequality? Take, for instance, a law that eliminated the estate tax. 
The elimination of the estate tax would harm society generally by permitting 
greater intergenerational accumulation of wealth and increasing wealth 
inequality.345 But, it would be hard to identify a particular person who has 
suffered a concrete injury as a direct result of the statute. Most of the people 
directly affected by the law would have benefited from it because they would not 
have had to pay the estate tax on their inheritance. The people who would be 
harmed by it would be distant and suffer harms not directly from the elimination 
of the estate tax but from the increase in wealth inequality and the various public 
health and societal harms that eventually causes. A plaintiff alleging that they 
would eventually be harmed (along with millions of others) by higher levels of 
violent crime and reduced life expectancies caused by an increase in wealth 
inequality resulting from the elimination of the estate tax would have a hard time 
establishing the concrete harm necessary to sue under the current rules.346 Such 
a plaintiff might also have difficulty with the Court’s “general grievance” 
cases.347 
This does not mean that no plaintiffs would have standing under the 
present rules. For example, a statute that increased taxes on the poor and middle 
class to pay for tax cuts for the wealthy, would likely provide standing for poor 
and middle-class plaintiffs to sue. They would be able to show both that wealth 
“pecuniary and property rights of individuals” has resulted in a standing doctrine that devalues 
“widely shared constitutional or other collective injuries”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, 
Remedies and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
3–7 (1984) (noting how the Supreme Court’s standing doctrine makes it difficult for plaintiffs who 
seek to “represent shared interests in enforcing lawful conduct” by the government); Patti A. 
Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 343, 362–64 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s focus on individual rights and
individualized harm makes it difficult for plaintiffs who wish to vindicate a public interest in lawful
government action); Kellis E. Parker & Robin Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 771, 771 (1978) (discussing the difficulties of using traditional standing rules in
cases that involve “public interests in public actions”); Tokaji, supra note 336, at 114 (criticizing
the Supreme Court’s “myopic focus” on individual harm in election law cases because “federal
election statutes are not solely aimed at protecting the individual right to vote . . . , [but] also aim 
to serve systemic interests in a fair election process”).
345  See supra Part III (describing the enormous adverse consequences of high levels of wealth 
inequality). 
346  See supra text accompanying notes 339–341 (noting that current standing rules require an 
actual or imminent injury in fact); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–14 
(2013) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin government surveillance because it 
was not certain that they would be harmed in the future by that surveillance). 
347  See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992) (“We have consistently held 
that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm 
to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking 
relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not 
state an Article III case or controversy.”). 
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inequality increased as a result of the statute and that they had suffered a direct 
and concrete harm (higher taxes and lower after-tax income) as a result. 
This hypothetical tax law might be a somewhat unusual statute, however. 
The 2017 Tax Act, even though it directs most of its benefits to the wealthy, 
actually decreases taxes for almost everyone. According to the Tax Policy 
Center’s analysis, the Tax Act resulted in after-tax income increases for every 
quintile, even though the largest gains went to those in the 95th to 99th 
percentile.348 So, even for a statute, like the 2017 Tax Act, that clearly increased 
inequality, it might be hard to find anyone who had suffered a sufficient “harm” 
under the present standing rules. This is a significant problem as it would be 
much harder to achieve the goal of the Amendment if statutes that increased 
inequality could not be challenged because nobody had standing. 
Thus, this Article proposes a new standing approach that takes into 
account the public nature of the problem of wealth inequality.349 The key to 
standing under this Amendment should not be whether a particular plaintiff can 
identify a concrete and imminent harm to themselves, but rather whether they 
would adequately represent the interests of the public in preventing excessive 
levels of wealth inequality.350 Because of the complexity and cost of this type of 
public litigation, in many cases, it will be institutions or organizations that are 
best placed to represent the public interest, rather than individuals.351 
Thus, the Amendment permits individuals or organizations to challenge 
the constitutionality of a statute or rule if they can show that they would fairly 
and adequately represent the interests of the public in opposing excessive wealth 
inequality.352 The concept of “fair and adequate representation” is borrowed from 
348  See Analysis of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, supra note 266. 
 349  Actually, this approach is not entirely novel; it has just never been adopted by the Supreme 
Court. Something similar was proposed in the 1970s as a way to reduce standing rules as an 
obstacle to public interest litigation. See, e.g., Parker & Stone, supra note 344. 
350  See id. at 775 (arguing that the key to standing in public litigation should be the ability of 
the plaintiff to adequately represent the interests of the public); see also id. at 771 (“While the 
interest of the plaintiff is essential to the prosecution of private actions, the public nature of public 
action minimizes the importance of the role played by traditional plaintiffs . . . .”); Mark V. 
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 700 (1977) 
(arguing that the proper role of the standing doctrine should be to ensure that the plaintiff is able 
to adequately present the case). 
351  See Parker & Stone, supra note 344, at 772 (noting that “institutional litigators,” such as the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, were instrumental in prosecuting key civil-rights actions). 
352  Cf. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated 
as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (concluding that Congress could confer on “any non-official person 
or a designated group of non-official persons” the authority to bring a suit on behalf of some public 
interest). In Ickes, Judge Frank said that “[s]uch persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private 
Attorneys General.” Id. 
50 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs class actions.353 
In many ways, the class representatives in a class action fulfill a similar function 
to the plaintiffs in an action brought under this Amendment—they represent the 
interests of a large number of people who do not have the incentive or the 
resources to litigate the matter on their own but who have an interest in the 
outcome of the litigation.354 Thus, it makes sense to subject the representative of 
the public interest under this Amendment to the same standards as the class 
representative in class action litigation. 
Borrowing from jurisprudence about Rule 23, it follows that to be an 
adequate representative, the plaintiff must be willing to vigorously prosecute the 
public interest in opposing excessive wealth inequality.355 Moreover, the plaintiff 
must be represented by qualified counsel and have the resources to litigate a 
complex matter against the government.356 If those criteria are met, then the 
plaintiff has standing to challenge the law or rule in question under this 
Amendment. To the extent that they conflict with this or impose additional 
requirements, the Supreme Court’s current standing rules357 are not applicable to 
suits under this Amendment. A body of law that has been used in, in practice, to 
“systematically favor[] the powerful over the powerless”358 should not constrain 
an amendment specifically designed to break the stranglehold of the wealthy over 
the government. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article’s conclusions are dramatic. The level of economic 
inequality the U.S. is currently experiencing represents an existential threat to 
our society and democracy. The U.S. performs significantly worse than most of 
the countries that most Americans think of as being our peers. By most measures, 
the U.S. is now a worse place to live than almost all of Europe. We have more 
crime, lower life expectancies, and lower life satisfaction. In fact, the countries 
353  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if . . . the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class.”). 
354  Cf. Parker & Stone, supra note 344, at 772 (proposing that public law litigation be viewed 
more like class action litigation). 
355  See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2007). 
356  Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1) (requiring the court to consider whether the class 
counsel has knowledge of the substantive law, experience handling complex litigation, and the 
resources to represent the interests of the class). 
357  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 358  See Nichol, Jr., supra note 343, at 304 (“[T]he standing rulings of the past three decades 
demonstrate that the injury standard is not only unstable and inconsistent, but it also systematically 
favors the powerful over the powerless. The malleable, value-laden injury determination has 
operated to give greater credence to interests of privilege than to outsider claims of disadvantage.”). 
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that look most like the U.S. today are highly unequal countries like Chile and 
Russia. 
These outcomes are a predictable consequence of our high levels of 
inequality. In study after study, high levels of economic inequality are linked to 
various ills, including higher crime rates, higher drug use rates, higher infant 
mortality rates, lower rates of economic growth, lower life expectancies, and 
lower social cohesion. The U.S. is not just unlucky or different. The society we 
have now is exactly what one would expect given that we have the highest levels 
of inequality of any advanced democracy. 
Moreover, the wealthy have essentially captured the government and 
ensured that it acts to protect and enhance their wealth. The majority of 
Americans have been largely unable to alter government policies favoring lower 
taxes on the wealthy over the last several decades despite the fact that only a tiny 
percentage of Americans have benefitted from those policies. According to many 
political scientists, there is something decidedly broken about our democracy. 
Taken together, these conclusions justify amending the Constitution. 
This Article proposes embedding in the Constitution an obligation on the federal 
government to estimate the impact on wealth inequality of all future laws and 
rules. The Amendment would prevent the government from passing a law or 
adopting a rule that increases wealth inequality unless the government can show 
that it is narrowly tailored to achieve an important governmental purpose. This 
would largely prevent the government from further increasing wealth inequality 
in the U.S. In fact, in the long run, it would almost certainly result in a gradual 
decrease in inequality. And if we can significantly reduce wealth inequality there 
is a good chance that hundreds of millions of Americans will live longer, 
healthier, and more satisfied lives. We could, through this change, make our 
society a measurably better place to live for virtually everyone. 
